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Abstract
The main purpose of this work is to provide a critique of Kwame Anthony 
Appiah's liberal cosmopolitan theory. To do this I will be providing a theoretical account 
of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception, that instant in which one perceives 
another as one who is from a cultural background other than one's own. This account 
will be constructed using concepts taken from and inspired by the work Georg Simmel 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The purpose of the critique is to illustrate one of the major 
shortcomings of Appiah's theory, which is that it does not take into account any 
research on the social-psychological dynamics of cross-cultural perception. It is because 
of this that he can only tell us what attitude individuals should adopt in order to be 
considered cosmopolitan, rather than what social conditions must be altered in order 
for individuals to actually want to become cosmopolitans.
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Homo sapiens has always been a species divided. Throughout our colourful 
history we have managed to find -  and continue to find -  a seemingly infinite number of 
reasons to include and exclude one another, to place people together and set them apart at 
all levels whether it be among family members or between hemispheres. One such reason 
is perceived ethnic difference. We see the tendency to divide as early as ancient Greece 
and Rome manifested as what Isaac (2006: 35) calls “environmental determinism,” 
whereby collective characteristics of groups of people were permanently determined by 
climate and geography; it was believed that essential characteristics of body and mind 
came from the external environment occupied by a specific ethnic group. Entire nations 
were thus thought to possess common immutable characteristics.
There can of course be no doubt that ethnic prejudice still exists today; the era of 
mass communication could well be termed the era of miscommunication as ethnic groups 
-  of which there are countless -  do not seem any more well integrated with one another 
than they ever were despite the hyper-escalated pace of global commercial development 
and the equally rapid augmentation of telecommunications technologies. For example, it 
has become well documented that Muslims “have become the targets of increased 
suspicion and prejudice and are frequently depicted as a threat in terms of political 
violence and gender inequality” in Switzerland (Green et al. 2010). A recent study of 
Portugese-speaking African immigrants in Toronto illustrates that most of them 
experienced discrimination by landlords based on skin colour (Teixeira 2008). With 
communities becoming transnational and visible minority populations steadily rising in 
western countries, our awareness of the other is perhaps more glaring than ever before.
1
So a certain obvious problem arises: what do we do about the fact that cultural diversity 
now pervades the once relatively homogeneous global west? ; Is it possible for a 
harmonious “cultural mosaic” to exist with equal rights of cultural expression, or will 
states continue to reinforce oppressive cultural hegemonies? To what extent should host 
countries accommodate the differing cultural practices of others? In short, what politcal 
and ethical questions arise in multicultural societies, and how do we address them?
These questions are continuing to be addressed by thinkers under a rubric they 
call cosmopolitanism. But as Pollock et al. have suggested (2000: 577), there is no easy 
way to define cosmopolitanism:
[C]osmopolitanism is not some known entity existing in the world...that simply awaits 
more detailed description at the hands o f  scholarship. We are not exactly certain what it 
is, and figuring out why this is so and what cosmopolitanism may be raises difficult 
conceptual issues. As a practice, too, cosmopolitanism is yet to come, something awaiting 
realization. Again, this is not because w e already understand and can practice it but have
not...Cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic
\
character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and 
definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and 
definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do.
Before we begin, however, we should at least provide some kind of idea as to what 
cosmopolitanism is. I will therefore provide a brief summary of its origins as both an 
ethical and a political philosophy. The former has its origins in the ancient world, 
whereas the latter takes its departure from Kant. I will then give a brief overview of
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where cosmopolitanism is as both a theory and a practice today. Finally, I will present my 
own thesis as well as provide an outline of its presentation in the following work.
Stan Van Hooft (2009: 14) arguably sums up all that falls under the rubric of 
cosmopolitanism in one sentence when he calls it “a response to a number of ethical and 
social problems relating to strangers, foreign peoples and other countries.” The word 
‘cosmopolitanism’ itself comes from the Greek word ¡cosmopolites meaning “citizen of 
the world” (Cheah 1998: 22; Van Hooft 2009: 15). According to Van Hooft the first 
recorded use of the word comes from the philosopher Diogenes the Cynic in the fourth 
century BCE when he was asked where he came from. However, it is the Stoic 
philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome who are credited with being the first to develop 
the idea that a person might be a citizen of the world by extending his concerns and 
responsibilities to everyone regardless of whether or not they are compatriots or 
strangers. As Van Hooft explains, the Stoics regarded the universe as an “overarching 
reality that established the forms of order in accordance with which we were to live our 
lives so as to live them ethically” (Van Hooft 2009: 15). Due to this belief in the universe 
as possessing an intrinsic moral order, the Stoics also believed that the forms and cycles 
of nature had been established by the gods to express their wisdom and love of justice. It 
was this conception of the universe that gave rise to the concept of “natural” laws, which 
were essentially moral laws that were universal in scope and thus not dependent on the 
established laws and customs of a particular polls for their normativity and applicability. 
For the Stoics humans were therefore meant to act in harmony with a universal moral 
order. This inevitably involved a devaluing of local loyalties so as to act ethically towards
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all people regardless of their national, ethnic, religious or cultural backgrounds. Anyone 
who abided by these ideas was therefore considered cosmopolitan.
By the time of the Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism had become “an intellectual 
ethic,” a “universal humanism” that sought to transcend regional particularism (Cheah 
1998: 22). The German thinker Immanuel Kant sought to make it more than this, 
however, by using it as a term for his own political philosophy that was written as a call 
to reform against the absolute dynastic states that still ruled Europe at that time (24). As a 
statist, Kant had a vision of an institutional cosmopolitanism that proposed “a shift from a 
merely voluntary ethical community of intellectuals to a world political community,” a 
“constitutional global federation of all existing states” that was to be grounded in the 
notion of a “cosmopolitan right” (22-23). This latter notion was articulated around the 
idea that “individuals and states, co-existing in an external relationship of mutual 
influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind [sic - passim]” 
(Kant, in Cheah 1998: 23). Such a state would fall “somewhere between the political 
community of the state in its lawful relations with other states (ius gentium) and a world- 
state!” Thus the historical significance of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, according to Cheah, is 
that it marked a turning point where a political morality needed to be formulated beyond 
the polis or state form that for so long informed western political thought (Cheah 1998: 
23). Instead of an absolute statism, cosmopolitanism for Kant was thus a “form of right” 
meant to bind people into a collectivity larger than the state that would include states but 
still surpass them at the same time.
As mentioned above, today cosmopolitanism has become many different things.
' j
Vertovec and Cohen (2002) place contemporary cosmopolitanism under six different
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rubrics, a useful categorization for our purposes here. First, they describe 
cosmopolitanism as a “socio-cultural condition.” As they explain:
The relative ease and cheapness o f transportation across long distances, mass tourism, 
large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in ‘world cities’, the flow o f  commodities 
to and from all points o f  the compass and the rapid development o f  
telecommunications...have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet, ; 
on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen. This is the sense o f  a mounting 
‘cosmopolitanism’ described by a number o f  commentators (2002: 9).
Such a condition, however, is met with both optimism and trepidation. On the one hand, 
many believe that this kind of cosmopolitanism should be embraced for all of the 
exposure it offers to various forms of cultural creativity, as well as the political potential 
that it has to challenge “various ethnocentric, racialized, gendered and national 
narratives.” On the other hand, many critics see this kind of cosmopolitanism as fostering 
an emergent global hybrid culture constituted by a mass consumerism of standardized 
mass commodities. Many are afraid that such a condition therefore precludes exactly 
what it is supposed to propagate, namely cultural diversity and awareness (9-10).
‘ A second sense of cosmopolitanism is understood as a philosophy or world-view. 
It is considered to be a political philosophy that claims we should live in a world 
governed by overarching principles of rights and justice, where all people possess 
common values. Thomas Pogge (1992) has suggested that this kind of cosmopolitanism 
can take the form of either a moral cosmopolitanism by which all people have a certain 
respect for one another, or a legal cosmopolitanism that sets forth universal rights and
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duties. A question that has been at the heart of this form of cosmpolitanism is whether or 
not one can be a world citizen as well as a patriot who is loyal to a single nation-state. 
Some, such as Georgios Varouxakis (1999) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (1998) have 
suggested that this is possible, while others, including Ulrich Beck (1998), have 
suggested that we seek to reinvent politics by putting “globality” at the heart of politics as 
opposed to national politics (Vertovec and Cohen 2002:10-11).
A third way to understand cosmopolitanism is as a political initiative that seeks to 
establish transnational institutions that could either bridge or overtake conventional 
political structures of the nation-state system. Such institutions “would coexist with a 
system of states but would override states in clearly defined spheres of activity” (Kaldor 
1999, in Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 11). This would be an approach to this kind of 
cosmopolitanism “from above,” as a framework of international organizations, complex 
partnerships and cooperative agreements between states. However, many scholars have 
also suggested that this kind of cosmopolitanism could also be shaped “from below” in 
the form of a “global civil society.” According to Vertovec and Cohen, such a society 
could be developed through “an exponential growth in the number, size and range of 
activities of transnational social movements and networks concerned with issues 
including the environment, labour conditions, human rights, women i and peace.” 
According to Gerard Delanty (2000; 2001), this kind of cosmopolitan initiative would 
require the emergence of a “cosmopolitan public sphere” of communication and cultural 
contestation that would be a necessary condition to make this kind of cosmopolitan 
initiative a reality (Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 11 -12). ,
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A second way to understand cosmopolitanism as a political initiative is at the 
individual level as opposed to an institutional level. A cosmopolitan politics in this 
understanding emphasizes that people should be encouraged to have multiple affiliations 
outside of their own sphere of cultural familiarity. In this sense of cosmopolitanism each 
citizen would be required to become a “cosmopolitan citizen,” one who is capable of 
mediating between national traditions and alternative forms of life. Nussbaum (1994: 4), 
borrowing from the Stoics, conceptualizes this kind of citizen as one who is surrounded 
by a “series of concentric circles.” Each circle represents a kind or level of attachment or 
identification, including self, family, group, city, country, and humanity at large. A 
cosmopolitan citizen would therefore be bound to shift from one “circle” to another 
(Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 12-13). '
Finally, we have arrived at the kind of cosmopolitanism from which the content 
of this work stems. Vertovec and Cohen split them into two'different types, that of an 
“attitude or disposition” and a “practice or competence.” Cosmbpolitanism as an attitude 
or disposition has been described as an outlook on or mode of engaging with the world 
(Waldron 1992). Ulf Hannerz (1990: 238) has described it as “a mode of managing 
meaning.” This orientation to or willingness to engage with “the Other” (ibid.) is an 
intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences 
(Vertovec 1996). Cosmopolitanism in this sense then represents a desire for, and 
appreciation of, cultural diversity. The cosmopolitan in this sense develops habits which 
will allow her to feel at least partially adjusted everywhere (Iyer 1997). Such an outlook 
or disposition would largely be acquired through experience, especially travel (Vertovec 
and Cohen 2002: 13). But along with this disposition, some (Hannerz 1990; Friedman
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1994) claim that cosmopolitanism should also be a kind of competence that allows one to 
navigate through multiple cultural systems of meaning while at the same time 
maintaining allegiances with all of them. However, Craig Calhoun (2002) has argued that 
this kind of cosmopolitanism may amount to nothing more than a “consumerist 
cosmopolitanism” that would be manifested in global exchanges of foodstuffs, artworks, 
music, literature and fashion. Although such processes represent a kind of 
multiculturalization of society, Calhoun argues, they also represent the advanced 
globalization of capitalism. The question then becomes whether or not this type of 
cosmopolitanism really brings exposure to and fosters tolerance of other cultures 
(Vertovec and Cohen 2002:13-14).
The purpose of the following work is to provide a critique of Appiah’s liberal 
cosmopolitan theory. However, we will not simply be critiquing his work in a standard 
fashion; we will also be providing a theoretical account of what I am calling the initial 
moment of cross-cultural perception, that instant in which an individual perceives another 
as one who is from a cultural background other than his own. This account will be 
constructed using concepts taken from and inspired by the work of the neo-Kantian 
philosopher Georg Simmel as well as the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The 
purpose of this account is to highlight one of the major shortcomings of Appiah’s liberal 
cosmopolitan theory, which is that it does not take into account any research on the 
social-psychological dynamics of cross-cultural perception. It is because of this that he 
can only tell us what attitude individuals should adopt in order to be considered 
cosmopolitan, suggestions which I argue are already obvious, rather than what social 
conditions must be altered in order for individuals to actually want to become
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cosmopolitans. The first chapter will be used to explicate SimmeTs “moment of 
individuation,” a theoretical model of social cognition that seeks to explain how it is that 
we perceive others as such. The second chapter will provide a similar explication, this 
time of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of inter subjectivity. The third 
chapter will consist of a critique of the work of all three thinkers; however as we will see, 
we will also use certain concepts provided in the work of Simmel and Merleau-Ponty to 
construct a single theoretical account of the moment of cross-cultural perception. In 
doing so we will be providing a unique theoretical perspective on the initial moment of 
cross-cultural perception, one that highlights some of the individual factors that prevent 
individuals from different cultural backgrounds from interacting. This account acts as a 
potential starting point for an alternative kind of cosmopolitan research, one that focuses 
on perception as a social barrier in and of itself, and thus looks to the broader socio­
economic conditions that might account for the social construction of these perceptions, 
with an eye to altering them. N
Chapter 1 :
Simmel and the Moment of Individuation
Form and the A Priori in Simmel
It is more or less unanimous among Simmel scholars that the dichotomy of form 
and content is Simmel’s central methodological tool (Weingartner 1959, 1960; Levine 
1971; Oakes 1980; Kaem 1990). Indeed, it would be difficult to overstate the extent of its 
use. In “The Transcendent Character of Life,” the first chapter of Lebensanschauung 
(1918)1, Simmel even goes so far as to say that what we call life cannot be experienced as 
such without this pairing acting as the basis of comprehension of our reality: “Form tears 
the bit of matter away from the continuity of the next-to-one-another and the after-one- 
another and gives it a meaning of its own, a meaning whose determinateness is 
incompatible with the streaming of total being...” (Simmel 1971a: 366). Although
Simmel’s use of the notion of content is fairly consistent (Weingartner 1959, 1960), he
\
uses the concept of form in a great variety of ways. Rudolph Weingartner (1959: 42-43) 
has provided a useful exposition of these uses by placing them under three categories, 
those of kind, level, and degree. Simmel distinguishes between kinds of form by claiming 
that the same object (whether of perception or of thought) can be understood according to 
principles that structure its content differently and relate those contents to one another in 
different ways. For example, I might understand a concept according to cognitive, 
artistic, religious, or philosophic principles. Levels of form can be understood as the 
levels of formal rubrics under which objects might be placed. If we use a religious 1
1 The title o f  SimmePs final book in which he presents his outline for a “metaphysics o f life.”
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symbol as an example, it is clear that the latter is not a meaningless entity, but could in 
turn be representative of a religious doctrine. This doctrine may be equated with a 
specific practice, which can belong to a specific religion, etc. The levels of form, then, 
involve principles that unify simple concepts into coherent systems, connecting them via 
a network of relations. Finally, Weingartner proposes degrees of form which, though 
similar to kinds of form, do not bear strict allegiance to a single perspective. In other 
words, contents that are already formed in relation to one kind of principle can be subject 
to forming by another kind of principle. For example, a religious symbol might become 
political and then be depicted artistically. For Simmel, we can never rule out the 
possibility of further forming: “[I]t is entirely a matter of contingent fact whether a given 
object...does or does not serve as a content in another context” (Weingartner 1959: 43). i
For our purposes here, the kind of form that we want to explicate based on 
Simmel’s work is both cognitive and social; they are the a priori conditions (in this case 
forms of cognition) that make individuation possible, whichxin turn makes sociation 
possible. Before moving on to an analysis of these particular forms, we will first provide 
a more general description of those forms that Simmel called “categories” and “a prioris” 
interchangeably (Weingartner 1960: 56-57).
In certain fundamental respects, Simmel’s forms of cognition resemble those of 
Kant. A form in this sense is a “principle,” or what Simmel calls “an objective power, an 
operative reality within us” (Simmel quoted in Weingartner 1960: 58), by which contents, 
which are normally a “sum of disconnected elements” (41) are made intelligible to 
consciousness. According to Simmel, these “functions” of cognition are difficult to 
isolate and give conceptual formulation to, a process that can be accomplished only by
' j
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-careful “observation, analysis, induction” (ibid.). Simmel considers concepts to be the 
simplest kind of a priori. These principles can be recognized by the tasks they perform, 
which include unity, separation, and structure. Unity relates a number of contents to each 
other in such a way that they constitute an object. As certain contents are circumscribed 
within a unity, they are thus given form and in this sense separated from other contents. 
Finally, since this process places the contents that it unifies within a set of determinate 
relations to one another, it thereby grants them a structure. However, it should be noted 
that no independent criterion of unity exists. Simmel states that this is merely the name 
given for the connections among the elements of a representation that are established by 
the operation of an a priori. The precise function of the latter is to “stipulate” what 




In the following section we will fully explicate Simmel’s model of individuation 
through an analysis of its constituent “dimensions.” Each of these latter consists in an a 
priori process of cognition that acts as a condition (or a set of conditions) by which we 
can come to perceive and “understand” an aspect of another human being’s appearance. 
For the first dimension we will simply use Simmel’s term, the “category of the Thou.” 
According to Simmel, this category allows us to identify the individual as the type of 
object that he or she is -  namely another human being -  and subsequently informs us of 
the kind of potential relation that we have to it. The second dimension we have termed 
“signifying agency,” which is made possible by those a prioris that allow us to “read”
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-various loci or “centres” of expression that in part constitute the human body. Simmel 
focuses specifically on facial expression and what he calls “fashion.” The third and final 
dimension of individuation that we will be discussing here refers to the first a priori that 
Simmel outlines primarily in How Is Society Possible? { 1908), a form of cognition that 
he argues allows us to attribute specific characteristics to other individuals2.
a. The Category of the Thou
For Simmel, the “category of the Thou” is a function of cognition that allows us 
to perceive a person as a unity, an object that can be identified via the recognition of its . 
singular form. This latter “is a total impression which cannot really be analyzed in a 
rational fashion.” Put another way, “the other person or the Thou -  like the ego or self -
f
is an ultimate, irreducible entity,” what Simmel also calls “incommensurable.” It gives to 
perception “the identity of the other person...as a unified entity: the other person who is 
immediately intelligible as an animate mind.” This assembled whole is the “first piece of 
knowledge...that we have concerning another human being.” Simmel goes on to explain 
that this category “has roughly the same crucial status in the world of praxis...that the 
category of substance or causality occupies in the world of natural science.” Aside from 
the fact that this category is for Simmel a fundamental concept of practical life, it is also 
completely unique, possessing a different status than other objects of cognition, since we 
are “obliged to ascribe a being-for-itself to the Thou. It is the same integrity that I , 
experience exclusively in my own ego — the self, which must be distinguished from
2 It is important to note here that in the actual perception o f  another human being as we experience it, these 
dimensions would manifest themselves simultaneously to give us an immediate, complete percept. I have 
isolated and ordered them here simply for the purpose o f constructing a clear analysis.
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■everything that is properly an object” (1980a: 102-106). In short then, the category of the 
Thou is a basic category of cognition that makes social life possible by cognizing 
individuals as discrete entities recognized as mind-body aggregates like ourselves that we 
can have knowledge of, even though this knowledge may differ from that which we can 
have of other objects.
The form of the Thou, which can be understood as the grounding function of
I
individuation, possesses both a “vertical” (object) and a “horizontal” (relation to the 
object) dimension. The former consists in that which was explained above, the initial 
experience of the other person as a unified, distinct, and structured object in the world 
that at the same time shares a resemblance with ourselves as a single, embodied being- 
for-itself, a likeness which acts as the condition under which we can have a unique kind 
of knowledge of it. At the same time as the other individual takes shape as a discrete 
entity, however, there at the same time arises its horizontal dimension, which 
simultaneously connects and separates two individuals within It social unity. This simple
form of sociation is what Kurt Wolff (1950) has translated as the ‘dyad’, however the
\
actual translation is “union of the two” (Zweierverbindung). It is significant for Simmel 
not only because it is the “simplest sociological formation” (122), that is, the 
quantitatively smallest, but also because it can be manifested in innumerable forms. What 
we are concerned with here specifically, however, is how Simmel himself conceives of 
the manifestation of dyadic potentiality in the moment of individuation, the specific 
sensation or experience of phenomenal reality that is had when dyadic sociation first 
becomes possible. First, an immediate unity is experienced in that one feels somehow 
connected with, drawn to, or even affronted by, another individual. In this sense there
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exists a distinct kind of being-with that evokes a certain nervous condition, a “readiness” 
triggered by the possibility of sociation that narrows one’s previous being-in-the-world 
and yet somehow opens its possibility in a new, distinctly social mode of experience. As 
opposed to the vertical unity that manifests itself before us as another body that is not a 
part of our own but rather an object outside of ourselves, the horizontal unity is one that 
we are in, a unity of relation that can be broken at will depending on the needs and 
desires of those involved. It is a unity that is experienced as opposed to that which is 
perceived (a unity of relation in sensation, as opposed to a unity of perception in an 
object). This is what Simmel means when he refers to sociation as a unity: “Sociation is 
the form (realized in innumerably different ways) in which individuals grow together into 
a unity and within which their interests are realized.” Simmel opens The Problem o f 
Sociology (1908) by saying that society “exists where a number of individuals enter into 
interaction.” He also says that this “unity, or sociation, may be of very different degrees, 
according to the kind and the intimacy of the interaction whiclf obtains” (1971b: 24). The 
possibility of dyadic interaction, then, the operation of the category of the Thou, requires 
this horizontal aspect for sociation as much as it does the vertical.
It should also be noted that Simmel characterizes this unity of relation as a 
paradox in that it is always constituted by both closeness and distance. This is perhaps 
best expressed in The Stranger (1908):
In the case o f  the stranger, the union o f  closeness and remoteness involved in every 
human relationship is patterned in a way that may be succinctly formulated as follows: 
the distance within this relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his [sic.] 
strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near (1971c: 143).
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Simmel makes a similar statement in On the Nature o f Historical Understanding (1918):
[W]e experience the other person, the Thou, both as the most alien and impenetrable 
creature imaginable, and also as the most intimate and familiar. On the one hand, the 
ensouled Thou is our only peer or counterpart in the universe. It is the only being with 
whom we can come to a mutual understanding and feel as ‘one’...On the other hand, the 
Thou also has an incomparable autonomy and sovereignty. It resists any decomposition 
or analysis into the subjective representation o f the ego. It has that absoluteness o f reality 
which the ego ascribes to itself (1980a: 106-107).
For Simmel, then, individuation is always characterized by an opposition within a unity. 
Though we feel a certain kind of affinity with another individual -  what Simmel at one 
point refers to as a shared “general human nature” (1971c: 147) -  we also experience
what could be understood as a “boundary” between us that* even in the most intimate of
' ■ 'v.
cases, “signifies that one person’s awareness may cover the sphere of another only up to 
that certain point where the inviolable sphere of this other person begins, and which he 
alone may choose to reveal” (2007: 54). The category of the Thou, in establishing the 
potential for social unity, paradoxically reveals that such a unity is at the same time 
characterized by distance. J
In summary, the category of the Thou is the dimension of individuation that
r
allows us to perceive the form of another human being as such. This form possesses a 
vertical and a horizontal aspect. The vertical aspect constitutes the form of the object 
itself, while the horizontal aspect consists in the “immediacy” of the other as one whom I 
can potentially enter into sociation with. This latter always constitutes a paradox in the
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sense that I am an object that is simultaneously similar and different to that which I may 
enter or have entered into a sociation with. This further implies that there is a boundary 
between us in the sense that I can never apprehend another’s experience in the same way 
that I can apprehend my own.
b. Signifying Agency
By ‘signifying agency’ we mean that capacity to express meaning -  whether 
deliberately or inadverently -  using one’s body as a medium. Though Simmel certainly 
does not exhaust this topic, his theory does pressuppose categories that allow us to 
understand central “aggregates of meaning” that partly constitute the, body as an 
expressive medium. In particular, Simmel chooses to discuss facial expression, as well as 
what he refers to as “fashion.” These two loci or centres of expression together constitute 
the second dimension of individuation.
For Simmel, eye contact is a key element of facial expression. He calls it “a 
unique sociological achievement” because it constitutes “the connection and interaction 
of individuals that lies in the act of individuals looking at one another” (1997a: 111). 
Such an act contains “the most complete reciprocity in the entire sphere of human 
relationships.” One of the reasons Simmel gives in support of the claim that the face is 
unique is that it simultaneously perceives and expresses: “One reveals oneself in the look 
that receives the other into oneself; in the same act with which the human subject seeks to 
recognize its object, it surrenders itself to the object” (112). As Deena and Michael 
Weinstein (1993: 30-31) have said in their explication of Simmel’s insights on facial 
expression, through the glance one acquires a kind of social knowledge that is
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“participative in the sense that it is only possible through self-deliverance or active 
transcendence of the self into the other’s vision.” The “mutual glance” is a unique 
“phenomenon of pure reciprocity that is immediate and independent of symbolization and 
abstraction.” There is a reciprocity or “bidirectionality” affected by eye contact that
contains a fundamental element or trait which exists independently of signification, one
l
that sets up an “emergent relation which cannot be analyzed into components...” As 
Simmel himself explains, there is nothing about eye contact that “crystallizes” it into an 
“objective structure”: “[N]o objective trace remains left behind, as is otherwise the case, 
directly or indirectly, for all types of relationship between human beings; the interaction 
dies in the moment in which the immediacy of the function lapses” (1997a: 112).
Eye contact would of course be insignificant without its place in the complex 
unity of the human face; as Simmel expresses it: “[T]he sociological significance of the 
glance depends primarily on the expressive meaning of the face...” (1997a: 112). For 
Simmel the face is primarily a symbol, not simply “of an'unmistakable personality” 
(1959: 278), but also “of everything that an individual has brought with him or her as the 
prerequisite of their life” (1997a: 112-113). It “is the essential object of inter-individual 
seeing.” A unique characteristic of the face is that, as “an organ of expression,” the face 
is “of a completely theoretical nature.” What Simmel means here is that, like other parts 
of the body, the face is not used to act in such a way so that the body is somehow 
“supported” -  used as an extension of the will, so to speak -  but instead acts as a locus of 
signification for the body in which is inscribed a “complete symbolism of lasting 
inwardness and of everything which our individual experiences have deposited in the 
permanent foundation of our natures...” (113). But aside from providing the form of our
more lasting character for others to interpret, the face also expresses to others the 
condition of our temporary internal states so that one may interpret how we feel or get a 
sense of what or how we are thinking, and does so concomitant to more lasting 
expressions:
By offering us the visually most complete symbolism o f  lasting inwardness and o f  
everything which our individual experiences have deposited in the permanent foundation 
o f our natures, the face also gives way to the highly changeable situations o f  the moment.
Here something emerges which is quite distinctive in the sphere o f  the human being: the 
fact that the general, supra-singular nature o f  the individual is always represented in the 
special nuancing o f  a momentary mood, fulfilment or impulsiveness. It is the fact that 
what is uniform and fixed as well as what is fluid and varied within our soul becomes 
visible as absolute simultaneity...the one always in the form o f  the other (1997a: 113).
It can clearly be inferred from these examples that for JSimmel the face is a locus of
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signifying agency that presupposes distinct categories that make sociation possible; they 
make it possible for us to perceive and “read” the meanings inscribed in or expressed on 
a person’s face in an attempt to characterize that individual in the moment of 
individuation. This process of characterization will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section. ■
Apart from the face, another centre of signifying agency that Simmel isolates is 
what he calls ‘fashion’. For Simmel the latter is an objective social process by which 
individuals simultaneously transmit their affiliation with a particular social group to 
others, and simultaneously distinguish themselves individually within that group. As 
Simmel writes in more detail:
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Fashion is the imitation o f  a given pattern and thus satisfies the need for social 
adaptation; it leads the individual onto the path that everyone travels, it furnishes a 
general condition that resolves the conduct o f  every individual into a mere example. At 
the same time, and to no less a degree, it satisfies the need for distinction, the tendency 
towards differentiation, change, and individual contrast (1997b: 188-189).
It should be made clear, however, that fashion does not simply operate “horizontally” for 
Simmel as that which designates individuals as members of particular social groups; it 
also operates “vertically” (hierarchically) in the sense that it designates individuals as 
members of economic groups, or in other words, as members of a particular class: 
“Fashion is...a product of class division and operates...the double function of holding a 
given social circle together and at the same time closing it off from others” (189). As 
general fashions (“trends”) are susceptible to frequent change, Simmel hypothesizes that 
these changes are not only an effort of people to distinguish themselves within groups, 
but also arise as a consequence of the group members’ shared desire to change once too 
many people have adopted “their” fashion. Otherwise, the social function of fashion as 
that which distinguishes becomes obsolete. Nedelmann (1990: 249) explains this 
concisely: “If the tendency to imitate fashion is not met with the tendency to invent new 
styles, then fashion becomes too diffuse a phenomenon and loses its unique power to 
divide and unite.” Fashion for Simmel, then, clearly has a communicative function that is 
intrinsically social. In the eyes of another individual, it operates as a locus of signifying 
agency that communicates what one “is” as an individual by expressing the fact that he or 
she perceives him or herself as belonging to a particular social group. This mode of dress,
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•however, works not only to communicate one’s social affiliations, but also one’s class 
position. However, regardless of what “fashion” (as we are using the term here) is meant 
to signify, what it is most important for us to note here is that Simmel perceives it as 
possessing a communicative function. He implies that fashion is a distinct type of bodily 
signification that is worn at least in part as an indication not only of what social group(s) 
one belongs to, but also as an indication of how one differentiates oneself within that 
group according to one’s own self-image.
Above we have outlined two distinct loci of signifying agency, namely the human 
face and fashion. Both can be seen as two distinct objects of social perception that the 
mind constructs concomitantly with the category of the Thou, which constructs the form 
of the human body as well as of potential sociation (intersubjectivity). These unities 
differ from the latter in the sense that these forms simultaneously act not as those which 
determine the object in its physical constitution or shape -  simply what it is and what its 
potential is for me -  but rather act as loci or centres of" signification that can be 
constructed in multiple ways in order to express to other individuals “who a person is” 
and “where they come from.” In other words, the observer constructs the entity of the 
face and the aggregate of fashion of another like a web of interconnected symbols whose 
meaning(s) can be used to infer propositions about the character of this other, that is, to 
what group(s) he or she belongs, his or her history, what his or her beliefs and values are, 
what kinds of behaviours he or she repeatedly engages in, etc. The face and fashion are 
therefore two distinct (but potentially connected) loci of symbolic materials that carry 
multiple possibilities of meaning that we can continuously construct and reconstruct in 
order to formulate hypotheses about the identity of the individual in question. It is clear
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-from the way in which Simmel discusses these loci that they presuppose categories that 
become operational during moments of individuation so that an individual may derive 
meaning from them in order to navigate his or her social environment.
c. The Social-Propositional Category
Finally, the third dimension of individuation consists of a third set of forms, what 
Simmel (197Id) calls the “social a prioris.” These could perhaps be more specifically 
called “social-propositional” a prioris. Simmel proposes three such a prioris, though here 
we will only be dealing with the first. According to Simmel, this first category is 
responsible for three “steps,” or the construction of three aspects of an individual that we 
infer based on appearance including type, ideal personality, and group affiliation. For 
Simmel, a “picture” of an individual is constructed from “fragments” of that person, a 
metaphor which can best be understood as an aggregate of the percepts of an individual 
that we use to construct an abstract totality to which we attach a set of specific attributes. 
We can then draw inferences from that totality to formulate propositions about an 
individual as a whole. Because such a process could never illustrate the individual in his 
or her entirety, we have to fill the gaps in our knowledge, so to speak, with 
“supplements,” or inferential hypotheses, that allow us to sustain our understanding of 
that person as a unified body of propositions, what he often refers to as our “picture” of 
that person (1950;1971d; 1980; 2007). The most important implication of this cognitive 
process is that our “knowledge” of a person is always inevitably based on certain 
“distortions.” As Simmel explains, these distortions “are not simple mistakes resulting 
from incomplete experience, defective vision, or sympathetic or antipathetic prejudices.
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They are fundamental changes in the quality of the object perceived...” (197Id: 9). It is 
therefore impossible to perceive a person in his or her “completeness”: “It seems...that 
every individual has in himself a core of individuality which cannot be re-created by 
anybody else whose core differs qualitatively from his own” (ibid.). Simmel describes 
this lack of knowledge elsewhere as the “border”, of an “inviolable sphere” of the other 
person that one cannot penetrate (2007: 54). The so-called “knowledge” of another 
person, then, is very much our own construction, one that, due to its discrepancies, is not 
reflective of the individual as a whole: “We do not perceive a person in the guise of a 
pure individual. On the contrary, we see him as if through the haze of the generalities of 
his situation, a mist which, in a certain sense, dissolves the clear outlines of: his 
individuality. Often it even obscures the extent to which we have no knowledge of the 
real personality” (1980b: 161-162).
As noted above, this process of coming to “know” a person that we initially base 
solely on appearance in the process of individuation, can be separated into three “parts,” 
two of which we will deal with here. First, we place the person under a general “type” or 
“category” (1971d: 10) that may be “logical-psychological” or “societal” (1980b: 159). 
As Simmel explains:
This category...does not fully cover him, nor does he folly cover it. It is this peculiarly 
incomplete coincidence which distinguishes the relation between a human category and a 
human singularity from the relation which usually exists between a general concept and 
the particular instance it covers. In order to know a man, we see him not in terms o f  his 
pure individuality, but carried, lifted up or lowered, by the general type under which we 
classify him (1971d: 10). V
23
-The second “step” that becomes operational during the moment of individuation is the 
identification of group membership. : Not only do we identify people as being of a 
particular type, but so too do we attribute to them membership within: a particular social 
group, so that we regard the individual as being part or not part of “my group.” For 
Simmel this causes us to look at a person “as if through a veil. This veil does not simply 
hide the personality of the person; it gives it a new form. Its purely individual, real nature 
and its group nature fuse into a new, autonomous phenomenon. Such a process “is one of 
the means by which one’s personality and reality assume, in the imagination of another, 
the quality and form required by sociability” (1971d: 11). The individual, in the moment 
of individuation, does not therefore simply assign attributes to another, but he or she also 
assumes that this other is a member of a particular social group in order to try to acquire a 
“knowledge” of him or her.
We have argued, then, that Simmel’s first social-propositional a priori is a form of 
cognition that becomes operational in the moment of individuation. This category 
functions in order to give meaning to (to understand) a particular type of percept, “the 
other” human being. It does so by placing the object (which in this case is another subject 
like ourselves) within a wider scheme of reference which allows the subject to formulate 
characterological propositions about the other based on his or her appearance. By placing 
the individual under the rubric of a “type,” the subject can draw propositions regarding 
what that person is “like,” i.e. the particular way(s) in which he or she generally behaves. 
Secondly, by identifying the individual as being a member of a particular group (the 
group to which he or she is normally affiliated), we likewise formulate propositions about 
others by attributing to him or her those characteristics that we normally attribute to those
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who belong to that group. Simmel’s first social a priori -  the social-propositional a priori 
-  then, can be understood as a principle of cognition by which we give a form to our 
perceived social reality, which allows us to “understand” a particular kind of object (the 




Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology o f Intersubiectivity '
As we discussed in the last chapter, Simmel’s social a prioris are to be understood 
within a Kantian framework, that is, as the forms of cognition that make social 
experience possible. In order to demonstrate this we focused specifically on what I called 
“individuation,” which is to be understood as the initial moment of perception of another 
in which the latter becomes an individual carrying a meaning for us. This moment is 
highly constitutive, though not entirely so, of intersubjectivity. As we will see shortly, 
Merleau-Ponty adopts a phenomenological method in order to provide an account of 
intersubjectivity. In order to provide a clear exposition of this account -  the primary goal 
of the following chapter - I will first provide a brief account of some of the most 
important features of Merleau-Ponty’s “method.”
Merleau-Ponty’s “Method”: Description andBeins-in-the-World
It quickly becomes evident upon reading Merleau-Ponty that he was a close 
reader of Husserl; many of the philosophical problems addressed by the former are those 
that were posed by the latter. As a philosopher who was concerned with the 
phenomenological/eidetic reduction, then, Merleau-Ponty is often labelled as a 
phenomenologist. However, although his works most often explicitly mention Husserl, 
scholars have placed him under the tradition of existential phenomenology following 
Heidegger and Sartre. Spurlirig (1977: 9) provides a useful account of this distinction:
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Whereas for Husserl any reduction was an eidetic reduction, an investigation o f  
essences, Merleau-Ponty focused instead on human existence, on man in the world and 
his concrete and contingent way o f  living. Phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, 
incorporated a study o f  what Husserl termed ‘being-there’, the particular and contingent 
form o f man’s existence in the world. Hence for Merleau-Ponty, as for Heidegger and 
Sartre, phenomenology becomes an existential phenomenology, concerned not just with 
the structure o f  the life-world, but also with man’s way o f existing in the life-world. 
Phenomenology is no longer conceived as a study o f essences, but o f the relation between 
essences and facts. Or, to put it another way, existential phenomenology is the study o f  
phenomena, which are both factual (they exist for consciousness) and essential (they are 
meaningful for consciousness).
It might here be pertinent to describe how Merleau-Ponty’s method differed from that of 
his predecessors. However, the English literature that exists on Merleau-Ponty’s method
consists of varying opinions. Priest (2008), for example, argues that Merleau-Ponty’s
: x
philosophy is explicitly against any kind of formal method, and Seebohm (2002) argues 
that it has no method at all. On the other hand, Lanigan (1972: 44-46) proposes that 
Merleau-Ponty does have a method that can be spelled out in three “steps.” Without 
belabouring the point, however, I will simply provide a brief overview of what I consider 
to be two central aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy that are pertinent to our exegesis 
here: his emphasis on description as central to phenomenological reflection, and the 
centrality of the body in his work as being-in-the-world.
In constructing his own method, Merleau-Ponty makes use of the tools supplied to 
him by the phenomenological tradition. Central to this method is what Spurling (1977: 
167) calls the dialectic between the transcendental and the descriptive. There are several
27 t
places in the preface to the Phenomenology o f Perception (PP) where Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly mentions description as being at the forefront of phenomenology. As he states 
near the beginning of his preface, “[Phenomenology] is a matter of describing, not of 
explaining or analyzing” (2002: ix). This comes from a conviction that the real has to be 
described in philosophy. He claims that philosophy “is an ever-renewed experiment in 
making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the description of this beginning...” 
(xv-xvi). Because phenomenology is a “disclosure of the world” (xxiii) it relies on 
description in order to achieve its goal of revealing being-in-the-world as it originally 
appears to our consciousness, since the latter is a correlate of consciousness and not 
essentially independent of it. Spurling (1977: 153) describes Merleau-Ponty’s idea of 
philosophy well in this regard as “re-presentation”: “Philosophy is rather to be conceived 
as a kind of presentation, or re-presentation, since it only re-presents to us what we have 
known all along, yet have somehow lost contact with...” This is not a positivistic 
description, but rather a hermeneutic one: “Since there are' no objects in the world 
independent of consciousness, the task of phenomenology is to describe them in terms of 
their intimacy to the subject, in terms of their intentional structure. Phenomenological 
description is not a copy of the world, but a hermeneutics” (168). Therefore, the 
phenomenological method -  the reduction -  also involves transcendence. This comes up 
many times for Merleau-Ponty. Right on the first page of the preface to PP he claims that 
phenomenology
is a transcendental philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions arising out o f  the 
natural attitude, the better to understand them; but it is also a philosophy for which the 
world is always ‘already there’ before reflection begins...and all its efforts are
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concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and 
endowing that contact with a philosophical status (2002: vii).
As Spurling describes: “Phenomenology is thus transcendental, in that phenomena cannot 
be understood apart from the notion of a subject or of consciousness as milieu of the 
universe” (1977: 168). The fact that transcendence and description go hand-in-hand for 
Merleau-Ponty is described well by Spurling: “The phenomenological reduction -  
placing in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural attitude -  represents the 
transcendental impulse of phenomenology, while the ‘direct and primitive contact with 
the world’ is its descriptive impulse. The aim of phenomenology is always to tie these 
two concerns together” (169). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty’s method is transcendent in that 
he wants to isolate certain “structures” of direct experience from the prepredicative 
world; it is descriptive in that it remains in contact with that world instead of becoming a 
product of analysis that loses any resemblance to anything'that we experience in reality. 
These two methodological notions of transcendence and description that are clearly at the 
forefront of Merleau-Ponty’s methodology will become important for us later in this 
work.
c..
Finally, we will here briefly summarize Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body that 
is always connected to the notion of being-in-the-world. As Spurling puts it: “Existential 
phenomenology starts not from the assumption of an ‘objective’ world in-itself, nor from 
a pure, constituting consciousness, but from their union, or rather their transcendence in 
its investigation of how organisms, and especially human organisms, are in-the-world” 
(1977: 15). For Merleau-Ponty, then, this being-in-the-world is primarily anchored in the 
body. As he says in PP: “I am aware of my body via the world,” just as “I am aware of
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•the world through the medium of my body” (Merleau-Ponty, in Carman 2008: 106-107). 
As discussed above, Merleau-Ponty was highly critical of the traditional rational subject, 
and so theorized what Carman calls “the bodily point of view” in order to overcome the 
“mind-body problem” that has plagued western thought for so long (we will be 
discussing this in more detail in the following section). For Merleau-Ponty, the bodily 
point of view stems from our own first-person point of view as embodied perceivers, “but 
is not the subjective or personal point of view traditionally theorized...” (94). It is rather 
an anonymous, “prepersonal” body-subject, that “one” in each of us that perceives in the 
world beneath the level of conscious reflection. Merleau-Ponty provides a description of 
this prepersonal body-subject in The Visible and the Invisible (VI): “The I, really, is 
nobody, is the anonymous; it must be so, prior to all objectification, denomination, in 
order to be the Operator, or the one to whom all this occurs...[It] is the unknown to whom 
all is given to see or to think, to whom everything appeals, before whom...there is 
something” (1968: 246). It is, as Hass notes, a perceiving body “built” with its sensory 
“systems” on the outside, and is hence always turned outward toward the world (2008: 
77). This is in turn why it is necessary to possess what'Merleau-Ponty calls a body 
schema, which is not to be understood as a representation of the body, but rather a 
“feeling” or “intuition” of it, “our ability to anticipate and.. .incorporate the world prior to 
applying concepts to objects” which constitutes “our precognitive familiarity with 
ourselves and the world we inhabit...” (Carman 2008: 106). This schema is utilized 
through motor intentionality, the “distinct, extensive ‘directedness’” that embodied life 
posesses below the level of consciousness (Hass 2008: 82). The body in the world is
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-therefore clearly a central feature (if not the central feature) of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy.
i
Merleau-Pontv and The Problem o f the Other
I will begin by providing a detailed summary of chapter four in the second part of 
PP, since this is where we see Merleau-Ponty’s first extensive discussion of 
intersubjectivity. It is this account of intersubjectivity that will be crucial for my thesis, 
since here we also find an account of the immediate perception of another. As many 
scholars have noted (Ware 2006; Carman 2008; Hass 2008; Dastur 2008), Merleau-Ponty 
begins by addressing what is traditionally an epistemological problem in the history of 
Western thought, that is, the problem of other minds. He begins by saying that just as 
there is a natural world that we always already find ourselves in, so too is there a cultural 
world: “Just as nature finds its way to the core of my personal life and becomes 
inextricably linked with it, so behaviour patterns settle into that nature, being deposited in 
the form of a cultural world.” Such a world presupposes the existence of others: “[I]t is 
through the perception of a human act and another person that the perception of a cultural 
world could be verified” (405). From this arises “the problem of the other,” which poses 
an important set of philosophical questions regarding intersubjectivity: “[H]ow can I 
speak of an /  other than my own, how can I know that there are other P s, how can 
consciousness which, by its nature, and as self-knowledge, is in the mode of the I, be 
grasped in the mode of the Thou, and through this, in the world of the ‘One’?” (406).
Merleau-Ponty begins to try to answer these questions by referring to his notion 
of the body: “The very first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest exist,
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is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of behaviour.” Before continuing 
further, however, he argues that “The existence of other people is a difficulty and an 
outrage for objective thought” (406). For in the latter, “my experience can be nothing but 
the dialogue between bare consciousness and the system of objective correlations which 
it conceives. The body of another, like my own, is not inhabited, but is an object standing 
before the consciousness which thinks about or constitutes it.” This poses a problem for 
Merleau-Ponty, however, since “There are two modes of being, and two only: being in 
itself, which is that of objects arrayed in space, and being for itself, which is that of 
consciousness” (407). He goes on to explain further: ;
Now, another person would seem to stand before me as an in-itself and yet to exist for  
himself, thus requiring o f  me, in order to be perceived, a contradictory operation, since I 
ought both to distinguish him from myself, and therefore place him in the world o f  
objects, and think o f  him as a consciousness, that is, the sorbof being with no outside and 
no parts, to which I have access merely because that being is myself, and because the 
thinker and the thought about are amalgamated in him. There is thus no place for other 
people and a plurality o f  consciousnesses in objective thought (407).
In order to remedy this problem, Merleau-Ponty argues that we must reconceive of 
perception “no longer as a constitution of the true object, but as our inherence in things”
r
(408). This involves acknowledging that the body and the world are inseperable in 
perception, that one cannot rightly “withdraw” the body from an account of the world 
without impoverishing it.
If we conceive of perception in this way, he claims, as “the inhering of my 
consciousness in its body and its world,” then “the perception of other people and the
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plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty” (408-409). This is simply 
because, if we conceive of our own bodies “as a perceptual consciousness, as the subject 
of a pattern of behaviour, as being-in-the-world or existence,” then there is no reason 
why another should not appear to us as such: “If...the perceiving subject appears 
provided with a primordial setting in relation to the world, drawing in its train that bodily 
thing in the absence of which there would be no other things for it, then why should other 
bodies which I perceive no t‘have’ consciousnesses?” (409).
But, of course, Merleau-Ponty does not simply leave the problem here. He argues 
that there exists “an internal relation” between individuals “which causes the other to 
appear as the completion of the system.” He illustrates this using an example:
A baby o f  fifteen months opens its mouth i f  I playfully take one o f  its fingers between my 
teeth and pretend to bite it.. .The fact is that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them from 
the inside, are immediately, for it, an apparatus to bite with, afid my jaw, as the baby sees 
it from the outside, is immediately, for it, capable o f  the same intentions. ‘Biting’ has 
immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance. It perceives its intentions in its body, 
and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own body (410). ,
This human capacity to exchange bodily intentions directly and immediately is what for 
Merleau-Ponty defines this human “internal relation” or “system” of intersubjectivity. He 
further argues that, because no single person has a monopoly on the perception of the 
world, but is always “outrun” by it, possessing a perspective with “no definite limits,” 
then “the behaviour of others can have its place there.” Therefore, the “cogito of another 
person strips my cogito of all value, and causes me to lose the assurance which I enjoyed 
in my solitude of having access to the only being conceivable for me, being, that is, as it
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is aimed at and constituted by me” (411). This leads Merleau-Ponty to . a more complete 
depiction of the intersubjective structure: *
[I]t is precisely my body which perceives the body o f another, and discovers in that other 
body a miraculous prolongation o f  my own intentions, a familiar way o f dealing with the 
world. Henceforth, as the parts o f  my body together compromise a system, so my body 
and the other’s are one whole, two sides o f one and the same phenomenon, and the 
anonymous existence o f which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits 
both bodies simultaneously (412).
Having depicted this structure of intersubjectivity that is experienced instantaneously in 
the social world, Merleau-Ponty can then argue that this other is, therefore, another 
perspective on the world that we share, a perspective that we have access to, an access 
that can potentially reconfigure the experience of our own perception:
, , , _ ..............
No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process o f  acting than the objects 
surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer o f  significance: they are no longer 
simply what I m yself could make o f  them, they are what this other pattern o f  behaviour is 
about to make o f  them. Round about the perceived body a vortex forms, towards which 
my world is drawn and, so to speak, sucked in: to this extent, it is no longer merely mine, 
and no longer merely present, it is present to x, to that other manifestation o f  behaviour 
. which begins to take shape in it. Already the other body has ceased to be a mere fragment 
o f the world, and become the theatre o f a certain process o f elaboration, and, as it were, a 
certain ‘view’ o f the world (411-412).
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Having said all of this, Merleau-Ponty suddenly backtracks and admits that the 
account of intersubjectivity that he has so far constructed does not fully do away with the
problem of knowing others. Even if we account for others as forms of behaviour that can
/
communicate perspectives that can influence our own, we still never experience them as 
such, but remain always in our own consciousness that “lay the same claims” as all of the 
others: “If the perceiving I  is genuinely an 7, it cannot perceive a different one; if the 
perceiving subject is anonymous, the other which it perceives is equally so; so when...we 
try to bring out the plurality of consciousnesses, we shall find ourselves back with the 
difficulties which we thought we had left behind” (414). Even though, as Merleau-Ponty 
explained, the positing of the other “strips” me of part of my being, he claims that we still 
have to understand how it is possible to posit the other to begin with, since “the positing 
of the other with his world, and the positing of myself with mine are mutually exclusive” 
(416). Merleau-Ponty here begins to call this “the problem of solipsism,” since there is “a 
solipsism rooted in living experience” that is “quite insurmountable” (417). This claim he 
never renounces: “The central phenomenon, at the root of both my subjectivity and my 
transcendence towards others, consists in my being given to myself.. .The truth of 
solipsism is there” (419). He does, however, find his way around the problem by 
claiming that this irremediable solipsism is not the whole truth of our experience: “I can 
evolve a solipsist philosophy but, in doing so, I assume the existence of a community of 
men endowed with speech, and I address myself to it.” It is thus impossible to escape 
contact with others entirely, to “transcend” them completely: “[L]et him utter a word, or 
even make a gesture of impatience, and already he ceases to transcend me...” (420). 
Therefore, as I am only ever given to myself from a first-person perspective, I never
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completely transcend the other entirely, nor does he completely transcend me; there 
always exists the possibility of communication between us, to access the other’s world 
“from the outside” because I am always a being in the world, and thus never outside of it: 
“Transcendental subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, 
and is for that reason an intersubjectivity” (421). ;
After having made this claim, Merleau-Ponty then seeks to place the social world 
on the same level of philosophical importance as the natural world: “We 
must...rediscover, after the natural world, the social world...as a permanent field or 
dimension of existence: I may well turn away from it, but not cease to be situated 
relatively to it.” He argues for its fundamental nature by placing it in the realm of the 
unreflective: “Our relationship to the social is, like our relationship to the world, deeper 
than any express perception or any judgement,” that “which we carry about inseparably
j
with us before any objectification” (421). He further writes that “The social is already 
there when we come to know or judge it...Prior to the process of becoming aware, the 
social exists obscurely and as a summons” (422). Thus we have the way in which
V
Merleau-Ponty confronts the “problem” of others, pronouncing that the world is 
fundamentally intersubjective, and, therefore, introduces the social as a subject to be 
philosophically investigated.
Merleau-Ponty and Intersubiectivitv
I will here give an account of Merleau-Ponty’s most fundamental claims about 
intersubjective relations. This does not include his work on expression and speech3, but
3 For information on these topics in Merleau-Ponty, see Froman 1982, Kali 2009, or Smitiene 2008.
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-rather the more basic claims he makes about the initial stages of inter subjectivity as a 
primordial phenomenon in the world, as this is the particular focus of this work. I will 
first outline the key arguments made by him in the chapter just discussed. I will then 
summarize the claim made in “The Child’s Relations with Others” (CRO) that the 
“primordial presence” of others is the very foundation of our intelligence, what allows us 
to learn. I will then explicate his notion of intercorporeity and its relation to 
intersubjectivity. This will be followed by a summary of his conception of 
intersubjectivity as a “system.” Finally, I will provide an account of his notion of the 
flesh in VI in order to make clear what he says about intersubjectivity in his final work.
In the chapter just discussed, we saw that Merleau-Ponty makes an analytical 
distinction between the “natural world” and the “social world,” the latter being “a 
permanent field or dimension of existence” (2002: 421). Barbaras has described this 
chapter by saying that in it “the human world is reconceived as a dimension added on top 
of that of the thing, a dimension whose givenness is rooted in that of the perceived 
world” (2004: 19). Merleau-Ponty is thus attempting to describe the social world 
phenomenologically, to illustrate exactly how it is that it presents itself to us, our 
awareness of it in everyday life. He thus claims that this “dimension” of life is always 
already part of our constitution as individuals, something that is always present as part of 
the “anonymous existence” of which we are all a part. In other words, the social world is 
simply there as primordial, a phenomenon that exists prior to any kind of observation at 
all. As Barral has put it: “It is indeed Merleau-Ponty’s method to present the fruit of his 
investigation and reflections without attempting to prove anything. He sees the “de facto” 
intersubjective relations which exist among men...and describes these relations as they
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occur before him” (1984: 216). We are thus always in contact with the social “by the 
mere fact of existing,” it “is already there when we come to know or judge it” (2002: 
421-422).
Merleau-Ponty makes several other key claims in this chapter. The first is that the 
body of the other appears to me as having a structure like my own, and therefore is a 
form of behaviour like myself. Even though I cannot experience the other’s 
consciousness in the way that I experience my own, to a certain extent his consciousness 
is expressed “on the outside” by his body. Because I can express my own consciousness 
in a similar fashion -  that is, because I am “in” a body that is able to express meaning 
through language and gesture - there exists a direct and immediate relationship between 
us in which we can communicate by interpreting one another’s words and gestures. For 
Merleau-Ponty this capacity constitutes a “system” that is what defines intersubjectivity. 
Therefore, because each individual is not just a “being for itself’ in terms of 
consciousness, but is also a body inherent in the world and is thus open to that world, the 
other is available to me not in the way that I am to myself, nor as an object, but as a being 
like myself whose body thus allows me to “be open” to him, to effectively “read” his 
consciousness to a certain extent as a form of behaviour.
The notion of the primordial presence of the other is an aspect that runs 
throughout Merleau-Ponty’s work long after PP. Throughout his work he possesses this 
tendency to make the claim that the other “just is,” that she exists for herself in the same 
way that I am a consciousness for myself, without needing to demonstrate or “prove” that 
she exists. For example, in “The Philosopher and His Shadow” (PHS) he writes the 
following: “I know unquestionably that that man over there sees, that my sensible world
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is also his, because I  am present at his seeing, it is visible in his eyes’ grasp of the scene.” 
He then depicts this “gleam” in the other’s eye as a kind of sign of the certainty of his 
existence: “Suddenly a gleam appeared, a little bit below and out in front of its eyes; its 
glance is raised and comes to fasten on the very things that I am seeing...I say that there 
is a man there and not a mannequin, as I see that the table is there and not a perspective 
or an appearance of the table” (1964b: 169). This description resurfaces in VI:
[S]uddenly there breaks forth the evidence that yonder also, minute by minute, life is ; , 
being lived: somewhere behind those eyes, behind those gestures, or rather before them, 
or again about them, coming from I know not what double ground o f space, another 
private world shows through, through the fabric o f  my own, and for a moment I live in it;
I am no more than the respondent for the interpellation that is made to me. To be sure, the 
least recovery o f  attention persuades me that this other who invades me is made only o f  
my own substance... (1968: 10).
■ . ’ ' ■ ' ■ ’ ’ ■ V  '
It is clear then that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of primordial presence is a significant facet of
his philosophy of intersubjectivity. He clearly dismisses the problem of the other as a
philosophical problem, instead valuing this instant, intuitive recognition of the other over
and above the kind of argument that could be made as “proof’ of the other’s existence,
even going so far as to say that such an endeavour would be impossible to begin with:
“[Cjertitude, entirely irresistible as it may be, remains absolutely obscure; we can live it,
we can neither think it nor formulate it nor set it up in theses. Every attempt at
elucidation brings us back to the dilemmas. And yet it is this unjustifiable certitude of a
sensible world common to us that is the seat of truth within us” (1968: 11). Therefore,
although we cannot prove the fact that there are others in the world with whom we share
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it, we can nonetheless be certain of the existence of these others in the same way that I 
exist for myself by virtue of their raw sensible presence and the kind of communication -  
sometimes wordless -  in which I can engage with them. . This notion of the primordial 
presence of the other is therefore clearly a central aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
of intersubjectivity.
As noted above, for Merleau-Ponty the social is a primordial • dimension of 
existence that “we carry about inseperably with us” (2002: 421). He seeks to further 
illustrate and elaborate this point by going all the way back to the very moment that we 
come into being as bodies in the world. In CRO, Merleau-Ponty uses the child 
psychology of his time to try to illustrate this point. He even goes so far as to claim that it 
is interhuman relationships that underlie the development of our intelligence, including 
language use:
[T]he intellectual elaboration o f  our experience o f  the world'is constantly supported by 
the affective elaboration o f our inter-human relations. The use o f  certain linguistic tools is 
mastered in the play o f  forces that constitute the subject’s relations to his human 
surroundings. The linguistic usage achieved by the child depends strictly on the 
“position”... that is taken by the child at every moment in the play o f  forces in his family 
and his human environment (1964a: 112-113).
The primordial nature of social life is especially instantiated by studies of what Merleau- 
Ponty calls “pre-communication” or, borrowing from the psychologist Wallon, “syncretic 
sociability.” The term refers to a behavioural phenomenon where, prior to six months of 
age, an infant, does not distinguish between himself and another as two separate bodies: 
“[TJhere is not one individual over against another but rather an anonymous collectivity,
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-an undifferentiated group life...” (119). This indistinction between oneself and another 
that is central to this first stage of the child’s life Merleau-Ponty refers to as 
“transitivism.” According to him, this phenomenon is correlated with the fact that, prior 
to three months of age, the infant is not yet conscious of his own physical body:
If the child under six months o f  age does not yet have a visual notion o f  his own body 
(that is, a notion that locates his body at a certain point in visible space), that is all the 
more reason why, during this same period, he will not know enough to limit his own life 
to himself. To the extent that he lacks this visual consciousness o f  his body, he cannot 
separate what he lives from what others live as well as what he sees them living. Thence 
comes the phenomenon o f  “transitivism,” i.e., the absence o f  a division between m yself 
and others that is the foundation o f  syncretic sociability (135).
Between the ages of six months and three years, according to Merleau-Ponty, the child 
only begins to become aware of himself, by becoming aware of his body and the 
beginning of a development for role-playing. It is only at three years that the child 
possesses a developed viewpoint as a separate entity (151-152). So as we can see from 
pre-communication/syncretic sociability, as well as the phenomenon of transitivism that 
is central to them, what Merleau-Ponty calls “the social,” or what we are here calling 
intersubjectivity, is something primordial, that which constitutes us prior to our 
awareness of it and certainly prior to our ability to understand it in the abstract. 
According to Merleau-Ponty’s research, intersubjectivity is the fundamental type of 
relation to the world on which all of the others depend, even those which, from an 
analytical standpoint, can be distinguished from social processes, including reasoning and 
other cognitive capacities. Merleau-Ponty expresses this well in PHS: “The things [my
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body] perceives would really be being only if  I learned that they are seen by others, that 
they are presumptively visible to every viewer who warrants the name. Thus being in 
itself will appear only after the constitution of others...” (1964b: 168). The ability to 
relate to and communicate with others is therefore a fundamental capacity on which our 
development as sentient, language-using beings is entirely dependent; we cannot even 
learn about the world around us unless there are others present to reveal this world to us.
So, if we are dependent on the existence of others for learning and subsequently 
acting in the world, that is, if social interaction constitutes us prior to any other dimension
of existence, how is it that this primordial dimension is made possible? Merleau-Ponty
r
takes his starting point at Husserl, who claims that the experience of others is first and 
foremost “esthesiological,” meaning of or pertaining to the senses. Merleau-Ponty uses 
this to conceive the notion of a brute sensibility shared by all which he calls 
“intercorporeality” (1964b: 168), “carnal intersubjectivity” (173), and “intercorporeity” 
(1968: 141) respectively. This notion denotes a feature of hunian existence that Merleau- 
Ponty poses as a universal, and as we shall see also prefigures his notion of the flesh.
. . .  ,  . V
What is most important for us here however is to illustrate this universal sensibility which 
is, according to Merleau-Ponty, the fundamental condition of possibility for 
intersubjectivity. He sums this up well with the following: “My two hands ‘coexist’ or 
are ‘compresent’ because they are one single body’s hands. The other person appears 
through an extension of that compresence; he and I are like organs of one single 
intercorporeality...What I perceive to begin with is a different ‘sensibility’ 
{Empfindbarkeit), and only subsequently a different man and a different thought” (1964b: 
168). Merleau-Ponty tries to describe intercorporeality at some length:
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The fact is that sensible being, which is announced to me in my most strictly private life, 
summons up within that life all other corporeality. It is the being which reaches me in my 
most secret parts, but which I also reach in its brute or untamed state, in an absolute o f  
presence which holds the secret o f  the world, others, and what is true (171).
This dimension of being is arguably even more primordial than that which can be 
circumscribed as “the social,” since it is the fundamental condition of possibility of the 
social: “If the other person is to exist for me, he must do so to begin with in an order 
beneath the order of thought. On this level, his existence for me is possible...” (170). 
Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, even more fundamental than the dimension of the social is 
sensibility itself, the primary stratum of existence that constitutes intersubjectivity.
Intersubiectivitv in the Flesh ^
As mentioned above, PHS prefigures an attempt by Merleau-Ponty to shift 
philosophical registers, to create a new philosophical outlook that would escape, or even 
embrace, the paradoxes of certain traditional formulations: He began work on a new 
ontology in The Visible and the Invisible (1964), a work that was never completed due to 
his untimely death. However, in this work he does provide insights regarding 
intersubjectivity that can only really be understood in relation to his notion of the flesh, 
perhaps the central concept in the part of the manuscript that was completed. I will 
therefore provide an outline of this notion, followed by what Merleau-Ponty says in 
relation to intersubjectivity in relation to his notion of the flesh.
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Merleau-Ponty’s first mention of thé flesh in any definitive sense occurs in a 
footnote in which he refers to it as “Sichtigkeit (“visibility”) and generality” (1968: 131), 
a description which more or less sums up the notion. He later goes into more detail, first 
characterizing the flesh as an “element” of existence (“Being”): . i
(t
It is this Visibility, this generality o f  the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to 
M yself that we have previously called flesh, and one knows there is no name in 
traditional philosophy to designate it...The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not 
substance. To designate it, we should need the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was 
used to speak o f  water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense o f  a general things midway 
between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort o f  incarnate principle that 
brings a style o f being wherever there is a fragment o f  being. The flesh is in this sense an 
‘element’ o f  Being (139).
Merleau-Ponty later elaborates on this notion by attempting to describe it as a kind of. - - . . x • , ■> , .
fundamental “duality” of existence by which that which exists (a tangible body) can 
simultaneously sense and be sensed, a “coiling over” of the sensible upon the sensing 
such that the two become joined and mutually condition one another:
Once again, the flesh we are speaking o f  is not matter. It is the coiling over o f  the visible 
upon the seeing body, o f  the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in 
particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such 
that, simultaneously, as tangible it descends among them, as touching it dominates them 
all and draws this relationship and even this double relationship from itself, b y , 




-In short then, the flesh could be called visibility, perceptibility, or sensibility itself as that 
which pervades Being. Merleau-Ponty' further characterizes the flesh using three 
additional concepts, what he refers to as “facticity,” “reversibility,” and “thickness”
respectively. First, the flesh is facticity in that it is the very condition that makes anything
that we could call a fact possible: “The flesh is...[n]ot a fact or a sum of facts, and yet 
adherent to location and to the now. Much more: the inauguration of the where and the
when, the possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word: facticity, what makes the fact
be a fact” (139-140). Secondly, the flesh can be characterized by reversibility since that
which senses is also part of the sensible universe and therefore itself sensed, and vice 
versa. It is reversibility to which Merleau-Ponty is referring when he mentions “the 
coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body” (at one point the flesh is also 
characterized as a “fold”) (146). Finally, the flesh is also characterized by “thickness,” a 
metaphor that Merleau-Ponty uses to refer to the inexhaustibility or transcendence of the 
sensible, the rich imperceptible “anonymous” expanse that provides the background at 
any given time of what is perceptible, that out of which objects are concretized in 
perception. Thus things for Merleau-Ponty are not clearly delimited “atoms,” but exist 
temporarily as “concretions” of the field of the visible for which the limitless depth of the 
invisible provides the base: “Between the alleged colours and visibles, we would find 
anew the tissue that lines them, sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is 
not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, a y/es/z of things” (132-133). It is furthermore
something like a conduit between the perceiver and the perceived, the means of their
interaction: “It is that the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive
for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between
45
-them, it is their means of communication” (135). The notion of the flesh of the world is 
thus ultimately an attempt by Merleau-Ponty to rid philosophy of the subject-object 
distinction by making this dichotomy part of a single corporeal fabric, or as he at one 
point calls it, “the formative medium of the object and the subject...” (147). As Merleau- 
Ponty at one point candidly asks: “Where are we to put the limit between the body and 
the world, since the world is flesh?” (138).
Now that we have given an account of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh, we 
can now look at the ways in which this transfigures his notion of intersubjectivity. In VI, 
Merleau-Ponty again poses the question: “How are we to name, to describe, such as I see 
it from my place, that lived by another which yet for me is not nothing, since I believe in 
the other -  and that which furthermore contains me myself, since it is there as another’s 
view upon me?” Again, Merleau-Ponty wants to emphasize the point that one of the main 
conditions of possibility for inter subjectivity is the individuals’ shared world: “I can 
count on what I see, which is in close correspondence With what the other sees 
(everything attests to this, in fact: we really do see the same thing and the thing itself) -  
and yet at the same time I never rejoin the other’s lived experience. It is in the world that 
we rejoin one another.” For Merleau-Ponty this is how “I represent the lived by another 
to myself: as a sort of duplication of my own lived experience” (1968: 10). And yet, just 
as Merleau-Ponty discusses in PP, the experience of another in a shared world is always a 
paradox since there always remains that element of solipsism in our experience: “[T]he 
thing itself, we have seen, is always for me the thing that /  see.” Therefore, since I can 
only rejoin the life of another “in its ends, its exterior poles,” I can never effectively 
prove the other’s existence, yet I am always certain of it: “[T]he certitude, entirely
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- irresistible as it may be, remains absolutely obscure; we can live it, we can neither think it 
nor formulate it nor set it up in theses. Every attempt at elucidation brings us back to the 
dilemmas. And yet it is this unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common to us that 
is the seat of truth within us” (11).
So what then is different about what Merleau-Ponty says about inter subjectivity in 
Vn  Again, he begins much the same way he does in PP, by candidly asking “why not?”: 
“Now why would this generality, which constitutes the unity of my body, not open it to 
other bodies?...Why would not the synergy exist among different organisms, if it is 
possible within each?” He takes another attempt at the problem of solipsism by applying 
his notion of the flesh to the problem of other minds:
[LJandscapes interweave...actions and...passions fit together exactly: this is possible as 
soon as we no longer make belongingness to one same “consciousness” the primordial
definition o f  sensibility, and as soon as we rather understand^ as the return o f  the visible
v
upon itself, a carnal adherence o f  the sentient to the sensed and o f the sensed to the 
sentient. For, as overlapping and fission, identity and difference, it brings to birth a ray o f  
natural light that illuminates all flesh and not only my own.
As we can see, Merleau-Ponty is again trying to escape the problem of solipsism by using 
his conception of the flesh to remedy the paradox of the other. He does this by uniting 
individuals within a fundamental, universal phenomenon of which we are all a part. 
Although this may at first only seem to consolidate the paradox and even attempt to 
justify it, the flesh actually becomes the very condition by which knowledge becomes 
possible:
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It is said that the colours, the tactile reliefs; given to the other,’ are for me an absolute , 
mystery, forever inaccessible. This is not completely true; for me to have not an idea, an 
image, nor a representation, but as it were the imminent experience o f  them, it suffices 
that I look at a landscape, that I speak o f  it with someone. Then, through the concordant 
operation o f his body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green o f  the 
meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my 
green his green, as a customs officer recognizes suddenly in a traveler the man whose 
description he had been given (1968:142).
Therefore, because there are no clear limits between the sentient and the sensible, and 
since visibility provides each individual with an inexhaustible depth that is forever 
abundant with new knowledge and multiple perspectives, the other is always potentially a 
source of knowledge for me and in this sense reflective of the same world of which I am 
always already a part: “[W]hat is proper to the visible, we said, is to be the surface of an 
inexhaustible depth: this is what makes it able to be opento visions other than our own. 
In being realized, they therefore bring out the limits of our factual vision, they betray the 
solipsist illusion that consists in thinking that every going beyond is a surpassing 
accomplished by oneself...” Furthermore, as beings that are part of this inexhaustible 
depth we are never fully transparent about ourselves, and thus even learn about this
i
particular phenomenon from the points of view of others: “[T]hrough other eyes we are 
for ourselves fully visible; that lacuna where our eyes, our back...filled still by the 
visible, of which we are not the titulars...” (143-144). Therefore, using a different 
approach, Merleau-Ponty maintains the same argument that appears in PP, which is that 
intersubjectivity is not really a philosophical problem at all that needs to be defended 
against reduction to solipsism: “There is here no problem of the alter ego because it is
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not 1 who sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a 
vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here 
and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual, of being also a 
dimension and a universal” (142). Because we are simply different perspectives of the 
same phenomenon then, we are all intrinsically by the same basis for communication.
Finally, it is clear that throughout his work Merleau-Ponty describes the 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity as a “system” or “structure.” We saw this to a certain 
extent in the chapter in PP. He does elaborate this point later, however, especially in 
CRO. He begins again from the premise that we experience ourselves initially as not just 
a body but as a body schema (a notion introduced in PP), what he here calls a postural 
schema:
[M]y body...is first and foremost a system whose different introceptive and extroceptive
aspects express each other reciprocally, including even the roughest o f  relations with
(
surrounding space and its principle directions. The consciousness I have o f my body is 
not the consciousness o f  an isolated mass; it is a postural schema. It is the perception o f  
my body’s position in relation to the vertical, the horizontal, and certain other axes o f  
’ important co-ordinates o f its environment... (1964a: 117).
It follows from this claim that there is no Cartesian distinction between my body and my 
consciousness; I am conscious of myself first and foremost as a body in the world bearing 
positions in relation to sensible things in that world that in some way appear as distinct 
from my own body. But because I possess a postural schema -  in fact, because I 
primarily am that schema -  it follows that my consciousness is not entirely a private 
experience, but is also turned out toward the world:
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. We must abandon the fundamental prejudice according to which the psyche is that which 
is accessible only to m yself and cannot be seen from outside. My ‘psyche’ is not a series 
o f ‘states o f  consciousness’ that are rigorously closed in on themselves and inaccessible 
to anyone but me. My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward 
things; it is above all a relation to the world (1964a: 116-117).
Now, because my consciousness is inseparable from my body, and my body 
always exists in a living relationship with the world, and provided that my own actions 
have a meaning for me, it follows that, at least in part, my consciousness could be 
interpreted by those who possess the same bodily “structure” as me since I am able to 
interpret my own actions: “If I am a consciousness turned toward things, I can meet in 
things the actions of another and find in them a meaning, because they are themes of 
possible acitivity for my own body...If, for example, I see another draw a figure, I can 
understand the drawing as an action because it speaks difectly to my own unique 
motility...” (1964a: 117). Therefore, since my own body is a “form of behaviour” (2002: 
412), then the other’s body, having a similar “structure” as mine (Merleau-Ponty never 
really clarifies this description or how one would be able to recognize another body as 
“the same,” however such a description is consistent with his phenomenological method) 
can act as a “double,” another form of behaviour like myself: “I can perceive, across the 
visual image of the other, that the other is an organism, that that organism is inhabited by 
a ‘psyche,’ because the visual image of the other is interpreted by the notion I myself 
have of my own body and thus appears as the visible envelopment of another ‘corporeal 
schema’” (1964a: 118). He also states that.: “[W]e must consider the relation with others
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not only as one o f the contents o f our experience but as an actual structure in its own 
right” (140). As we illustrated above, Merleau-Ponty already makes this point as far back 
as PP. However, in CRO he elaborates this point further and insists on intersubjective 
interaction as being a kind of “totality,” a “form” in its own right similar to the way in 
which Simmel describes the dyad:
To be aware that one has a body and that the other’s body is animated by another psyche 
are two operations that are not simply logically symmetrical but form a real system. To 
notice, on the one hand, that I have a body which can be seen from outside and that for 
others I am nothing but a mannequin, gesticulating at a point in space and, on the other 
hand, to notice that the other has a psyche -  i.e., that this body I see before me like a 
mannequin gesticulating at a point in space is animated by another psyche -  are two 
moments o f  a single whole...They are complimentary operations, and the experience o f  
my body and the body o f  the other form a totality and constitute a ‘form’ (1964a: 120).
Finally, Merleau-Ponty proposes that this system of intersubjectivity is constituted by an 
additional feature called “mimesis,” which is very similar to the way in which he 
describes the “openness” that we have to others, “how I can be open to phenomena which 
transcend me, and which nevertheless exist only to the extent that I take them up and live 
them...” (2002: 423):
Mimesis is the ensnaring o f me by the other, the invasion o f  me by the other; it is that 
attitude whereby I assume the gestures, the conducts, the favourite words, the ways o f  
doing things o f those whom I confront...It is a manifestation o f  a unique system which 
unites my body, the other’s body, and the other himself...this power is given to me with 
the power I have over my own body...In sum, our perceptions arouse in us a
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reorganization o f  motor conduct, without our already having learned the gestures in 
question (1964a: 145-146).
Therefore, as we saw in PP, it is clear that Merleau-Ponty does not simply want to 
conceptualize others as merely a kind of object that we confront in the world in the same 
way that we confront other objects in a detached manner. Others for us are rather other 
consciousnesses that resemble us in their constitution, and so they are other perspectives 
on a common world that we can communicate with about that world. Furthermore, 
because we are constituted by the same world as a similar approach to it, our interaction 
is of a specific type of communication and behaviour, a being-with that constitutes a very 
particular type of existence. Intersubjectivity is in this sense a system of behavioural 
exchange whereby meanings are appropriated from the behaviour of others, a 
phenomenon made possible by the fact that I myself am a body that can articulate 
meaning through its usage.
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Chapter 3:
Liberal Cosmopolitanism and the Initial Moment of Cross-Cultural
Perception
This chapter is divided into three major sections. In the first section, we will 
explicate and critique Appiah’s notion of cosmopolitanism4. The second section will 
consist of a critique of the concepts of both Simmel and Merleau-Ponty that have been 
presented in this work so far. This section will include an appropriation of those notions 
with which we can formulate a description of the initial moment of experience of cross- 
cultural perception. In Simmel’s case, this will also involve what I call a “critical 
modification” of certain notions since, although certain notions cannot be used as they are 
presented by Simmel to describe accurately cross-cultural perception, they can be 
reformulated in such a way so that they might do so. The third section will not only put 
the concepts of Simmel and Merleau-Ponty that we have appropriated or “modified” 
together into a single “account” of the moment of cross-cultural perception in order to 
summarize and further elaborate these ideas, but will also further elaborate our critique of 
Appiah’s thought.
4 This does not include an explication o f  the political aspects o f  cosmopolitanism that Appiah discusses, 
since these are not relevant to our study here.
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Appiah and Liberal Cosmopolitanism
! /
In The Ethics o f Identity (El), Appiah begins by admitting that he is defending a 
“wishy-washy version of cosmopolitanism” (2005: 222). He then starts calling the 
platform he is defending “liberal cosmopolitanism,” a term which he later drops for the 
entirety of Cosmopolitanism (2006). In El (2005: 240), he argues that Martha Nussbaum 
perfectly articulates the central tenets of liberal cosmopolitanism in an essay entitled 
“Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” (1994). Nussbaum argues that not only should we first 
recognize and respect reason and moral capacity, which she draws from her study of 
Aristotle and the Stoics, as the two most fundamental characteristics of humanity 
wherever we go, but also that we should “behave so as to treat with equal respect the 
dignity of reason and moral choice in every human being.” She is thus not only arguing 
that we should accept reason and morality as definitive of humanity, but also that these 
traits are what make us all dignified; it is this shared dignity that makes us all equal. In 
addition she argues that the “local” should be given “an additional measure of concern” 
because such consideration “is the only sensible way to do good” (Nussbaum, in Appiah 
2005:240). . . . . . .
Appiah echoes Nussbaum to some extent throughout his own rendition of 
cosmopolitanism, insisting that human life should be valued above all else in our dealings 
with one another, and that we all possess both universally recognizable and locally 
determined values that must be, if not shared, at least respected:
A tenable cosmopolitanism, in the first instance, must take seriously the value o f  human 
life, and the value o f  particular human lives, the lives people have made for themselves, 
within the communities that help lend significance to those lives. This prescription
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captures the challenge. A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile a kind: o f  
universalism with the legitimacy o f  at least some forms o f  partiality (2005: 222-223).
This means that for Appiah cosmopolitanism is first and foremost “a form of 
universalism that is sensitive to the ways in which historical context may shape the 
significance of a practice” (2005: 256). We see this same dichotomy of universalism and 
particularism at work in his later writings as well: “I want to hold on to at least one 
important aspect of the objectivity of values: that there are some values that are, and 
should be, universal, just as there are lots of values that are, and must be, local” (2006: 
xxi). And he later writes: “[Cjosmopolitanism is, in a slogan, universality plus 
difference...” (151). At the same time, however, Appiah departs slightly from Nussbaum 
by making it clear that it is not simply the récognition of a common human nature 
through shared principles and values that makes cosmopolitanism possible, but instead 
what he calls the “moral epistemology” of being able to grasp stories:
[W]hat makes the cosmopolitan experience possible for us, whether as readers or as 
travellers, is not that we share beliefs and values because o f our common capacity for 
reason: in the novel, at least, it is not “reason” but a different human capacity that 
grounds our sharing: namely, the grasp o f  a narrative logic that allows us to construct the 
world to which,our imaginations respond...the basic human capacity to grasp stories, 
even strange stories, is also what links us, powerfully, to others, even strange others 
(2005:257).
It is this “grasp of a narrative logic” that allows people all over the world to share in the 
pleasure of engaging with different art forms (novels, music, film, philosophy) that allow
55
us to “learn about the extraordinary diversity of human responses to our world aind the 
myriad points of intersection of those various responses” (2005: 258). It is clear then that 
for Appiah cosmopolitanism is both an ethical approach to the encountering of social 
difference as well as a call for openness to cultural experience that can allow one to 
enrich one’s own life (he later names this openness “fallibilism”). Appiah blends these 
two points nicely at the end of El, but insists that the cosmopolitan should never value the 
aesthetic over and above the ethical:
[Cosm opolitanism...sees a world o f  cultural and social variety as a precondition for the 
self-creation that is at the heart o f  a meaningful human life...The cosmopolitan’s high
n ' ’ ■ ' . ......  •
appraisal o f  variety flows...from the human choices it enables, but the variety is not 
something we value no matter what...[T]he fundamental idea that every society should 
respect human dignity and personal autonomy is more basic than the cosmopolitan love 
o f variety; indeed...it is the autonomy that variety enables that is its fundamental 
justification. Cosmopolitans do not ask other people to maintaih the diversity o f  the 
species at the price o f their individual autonomy... The options we need in order for our 
choices to be substantial must be freely sustained, as must the human variety whose 
existence is, for the cosmopolitan, an endless source o f  insight and pleasure (2005: 268- 
269).
In Cosmopolitanism (2006), Appiah adds a new premise to his variant of 
cosmopolitanism, which is that every human being has ethical ties to every other. As he 
states in his introduction: “[W]e have obligations to others, obligations that stretch 
beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even the more 
formal ties of a shared citizenship...the one thought that cosmopolitans share is that no
56
local loyalty can ever justify forgetting that each human being has responsibilities to 
every other” (2006: xv-xvi). Or as he later writes: “[W]e cosmopolitans believe in 
universal truth...One truth we hold to...is that every human being has obligations to 
every other. Everybody matters: that is our central idea” (144). In order for us to fulfill 
those obligations, however, we of course have to be able to interact sociably with one 
another. Appiah stresses that cosmopolitanism “begins with the simple idea that in the 
human community, as in national communities, we need to develop habits of coexistence:
conversation in its older meaning, of living together, association” (xviii-xix). Although he
j
maintains a very general universalism that is never presented very concretely, he stresses 
that difference is not a condition that is to be “overcome” through conformity to a 
common language or conceptual apparatus: “Cosmopolitans suppose that 'all cultures 
have enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation. But they don’t 
suppose, like some universalists, that we could all come to agreement if only we had the 
same vocabulary” (57). Agreement and cultural uniformity, then, are not what Appiah
seeks, since this would be counter to the cosmopolitan principle that openness to
\
difference can enrich one’s life: 1
I am urging that we should learn about people in other places, take an interest in their 
civilizations, their arguments, their errors, their achievements, not because that will bring 
us to agreement, but because it will help us get used to one another. If that is the aim, 
then the fact that we have all these opportunities for disagreement about values need not 
put us off. Understanding one another may be hard; it can certainly be interesting. But it 
doesn’t require that we come to agreement (2006: 78).
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Appiah, therefore, thinks that as long as there exist certain commonalities, between 
people, then the differences ultimately do not matter: :“[T]he points of entry to cross- 
cultural conversations are things that are shared by those who are in the conversation.
They do not need to be universal; all they need to be is what these particular people have
[
in common. Once we have found enough we share, there is the further possibility that we 
will be able to enjoy discovering things we do not yet share” (2006: 97). For Appiah, due 
to the common characteristics that humans possess, it is possible not only to 
communicate but also to live with one another in spite of all of our differences; his 
universalism. is, therefore, the key to the anticipated success of his cosmopolitan 
philosophy.
To ensure clarity on the subject, I will here briefly summarize Appiah’s notion of 
cosmopolitanism. First, we see that at the heart of Appiah’s cosmopolitan ethics is the 
liberal right to individual autonomy, as well as the ethico-ontological claim that each 
human being has a moral obligation to every other simply'through the mere fact of 
existence. In addition to these “realities” is that of social difference. For the 
cosmopolitan, this difference is not something to be feared or ignored but rather provides 
an opportunity for self-transformation and enrichment. Such an opportunity is made 
possible by the fact that human beings are constituted by their similarities to one another 
as much as they are by their differences. These similarities or universal traits are what 
allow for social engagement across what might be perceived as cultural barriers. Appiah 
emphasizes the point that we do not need to share or agree with all the different values 
that we encounter or even understand them; we merely need to acknowledge them and 
allow for them in practice, provided that they do not prevent the autonomy; of other
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-individuals. Finally, he emphasizes one of the primary ways that we might engage with 
difference, which is through the exchange and contemplation of cultural objects. Because 
these objects share a narrative form that is universal, they provide points of entry by 
which to engage in cross-cultural dialogue.
We can immediately recognize a number of problems with Appiah’s theory. First, 
there exists a stark contradiction between the right to individual autonomy and the ethico- 
ontological claim that each human being has a moral obligation to every other; in 
practice, there is no way of reconciling the two as ethically coextensive. As one is a right 
and the other an obligation, they could easily become mutually exclusive in a situation 
that called for the mobilization of both. It is therefore simply erroneous for Appiah to 
expect that both of these claims could be upheld simultaneously at all times. Secondly, 
Appiah sets up a major problem for himself when he claims that humans possess 
universal characteristics. Although this may be true from a biological standpoint, it is 
much more difficult to illustrate at a behavioural level. Cultural practices are manifested 
with seemingly unlimited variability, and so it is impossible to say whether or not 
universal traits exist. The problem is given a new dimension when we consider the fact 
that it is very difficult to tell which behaviours can be considered “the same,” since those 
that appear similar may be correlated with different, culturally-based mental phenomena. 
Thirdly, it is redundant to say that we must allow for certain values in practice as long as 
they do not undermine individual autonomy, since what undermines it from one 
perspective may be seen to reinforce it by another. This is not to mention that the notion 
of “individual autonomy” comes from a particular conceptual framework that is the 
product of an upbringing in a particular culture with its own unique history. It might not
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-even have an equivalent in some other languages, and thus to impose it as a universal 
value on another culture would, to many, be seen as an act of cultural imperialism, which 
of course contradicts the idea of our moral obligation to others. Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism, then, mostly due to the simplicity of its claims, does not provide a 
framework within which to imagine a functioning cosmopolitan practice.
The other major problem with Appiah’s cosmopolitanism, the one that we want to 
place emphasis on here, is that it never attempts to answer a single crucial question: why 
cosmopolitanism? There is nothing inherent in existence that tells me that I have 
responsibilities to others, especially those who I do not know. But Appiah never defends 
his claim to the contrary, instead presenting it as if it were self-evident. But if I argue that 
I have no such responsibilities, then it follows that I do not have them to those who I 
consider different from myself. So why then should I engage with, let alone 
acknowledge, those who are different from me? Why should I make room for their values 
and practices if I do not agree with them? Will I really live a lesser life for it? Will they? 
None of these questions are answered by Appiah because he begins from certain claims 
without defending them; he decrees but he does not argue and therefore does not 
persuade. In E l he writes: “Who we are, as any viable cosmopolitanism must 
acknowledge, helps determine what we care about” (2005: 242). For me, there is a hint of 
irony in this statement since Appiah does not acknowledge a key implication of this 
insight for his philosophy, namely that who he is helps determine what he cares about. In 
other words, Appiah’s philosophy is simply an articulation of his own biases that he 
never adequately defends. As a well-educated philosopher, Appiah himself is attracted to 
the opportunities he has for self-enrichment in dialogue with cultures different from his
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own. Because he sees value in other ways of life, he believes that those values should be
\
acknowledged, respected, and upheld by those who choose to uphold them. But how do 
such endeavours resonate with others? Are there not individuals who do not want to 
explore other cultures? If so, why not? I of course do not want to claim that I can answer 
all of these questions here. What I will argue here and return to at the end of this chapter 
is that many people do not choose to live a cosmopolitan way of life because of the ways 
that they perceive people with cultural practices that are different from their own. In other 
words, it is these perceptions that largely determine whether or not an individual will 
voluntarily enter into a relationship with someone he perceives to be culturally different 
from himself. I will further elaborate this argument at the end of this chapter, but for now 
let us return to Simmel and Merleau-Ponty so that we may construct an account of the 
initial moment of cross-cultural perception.
Simmel and Cross-Cultural Perception
In the first chapter, we provided an account of Simmel’s “moment of 
individuation,” a neo-Kantian model of social cognition that isolates several a priori 
processes of cognition that become active at the moment in which we perceive another 
individual in our field of vision as that which conveys meaning. We outlined three 
“dimensions” of this moment, three a priori processes of cognition by which we come not 
only to perceive but also to “understand” (interpret) another human being based on the 
meanings conveyed through her appearance. It is important for us to note here that 
Simmel’s method is here not at issue; we do not want to provide a critique of Simmel’s 
understanding of Kant, or isolate any conceptual problems or inconsistencies that it might
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contain. The purpose is rather to see whether or not the positive content of these a priori 
processes -  that is, the visible and meaningful phenomena that they yield -  can help us to 
provide a descriptive account of the constitutive elements of the moment of perception of 
an individual who is considered to be “different,” one who visibly engages in cultural 
practices different than one’s own.
a. Critique , .
As discussed in the first chapter, Simmel’s second dimension of individuation is 
“signifying agency.” We described this as one’s capacity to express meaning using one’s 
body as a medium of expression. There are two “centres of expression” that Simmel 
explicitly discusses in detail, namely facial expression and what he calls “fashion.” We 
concluded that both one’s face as well as one’s clothing are used by the perceiver to infer
propositions about an individual’s character based on the meanings that these centres of
v
expression convey for the observer. But Simmers account of facial expression, although 
insightful and compelling, does unfortunately not really provide us with any concepts that 
could assist us in providing an account of the initial moment of intercultural perception. 
This is simply because there is nothing in the face alone that necessarily indicates a set of 
cultural practices that one is unfamiliar with; an individual who possesses different 
phenotypical traits than one’s own do not necessarily engage in different cultural 
practices. If, for example, I see a person whose face has different phenotypical traits than 
my own, but who speaks my own language flawlessly with a comparable accent, and who 
dresses either similarly to myself or in a way that I am familiar with, than I cannot 
suggest from his face alone that he possesses a different cultural background than myself,
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whereas I could propose this based on language or fashion alone. In other words, 
phenotypical traits are not directly expressive of social difference, whereas language and 
fashion are. Therefore, Simmel’s account of facial perception can in no way be used to 
describe the moment of intercultural perception.
b. Appropriations
As we explained in chapter one, Simmel describes the perception of another 
human being as “an ultimate, irreducible entity,” that which is “immediately intelligible 
as an animate mind,” and is also the “first piece of knowledge” that we have concerning 
another human being. He is therefore clearly against the analogical reasoning argument 
which postulates that we identify another human being as such through a comparison 
with our own bodies. For him the identification of another human being in our perceptual 
field is automatic and instantaneous, not requiring any kind of reasoning in order to 
identify the individual as such. And just as there is no reasoning process that allows us to 
identify another human being as such, so too is there no such process Through which we 
infer that another is culturally “different”; the awareness of such a phenomenon strikes us 
at the same time that we realize we are, looking at another human being. Just as I 
immediately recognize an individual as such, so too do I understand that he is not a part 
of “my group,” meaning he does not share in many of the same beliefs and practices that 
I do (at least, this is what I assume). Therefore, as we will see, Simmel’s notion of die 
form of the Thou will aid us in formulating an account of intercultural perception.
In chapter one, we also explicated Simmel’s account of fashion. Simmel tells us 
that fashion is what signifies that one is part of a specific social group. If this is the case,
- it follows that fashion is itself an embodied cultural practice, a distinct physical form of 
cultural expression that is in some way indicative of certain traits and practices by which 
a group is defined. So what happens then when an individual who is dressed in a certain 
way is perceived by someone who is not familiar with the general traits and practices of a 
specific social group that that individual’s fashion is representative of? The answer to this 
question will become clear in the final section of this chapter, but it first requires that we 
modify a couple of Simmel’s concepts and thus introduce notions of our own. For now it 
is enough to place emphasis on Simmel’s main point and say that because fashion is an 
embodied cultural practice, it therefore designates one as being part of a specific social 
group that is defined by specific traits and practices. It is therefore an essential notion for 
our description of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception.
c. Modifications
, . r • . ................... . . ' V
The form of the Thou, which according to Simmel provides us with the initial 
perception of another, also provides us with a specific kind of relation to him that he 
captures in his notion of the dyad. As we explained, the dyad is a social mode of 
experience, a “unity of relation in sensation” whereby one feels drawn to another that one 
can potentially engage with socially. The point implicated here when considering social 
difference is that not every dyadic perception will be pregnant with the potential for 
social engagement. Due to an individual’s apparent strangeness, one might consider the 
sight of another with aversion or even repulsion (Simmel 1971: 331). So how exactly do 
we account for this notion of strangeness that Simmel puts forth while also accounting for
j
the form of the dyad, two seemingly contradictory notions? Simmel accounts for this
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-problem in his elaboration of the paradoxical nature of the dyad. As he explains, an 
encounter with one who is unfamiliar to us (who Simmel calls “the stranger”) is 
characterized both by closeness and remoteness, by distance and strangeness. The 
stranger is someone who we immediately experience and who is as “real” to us as our 
own conscious “selves,” but who at the same time we cannot reduce to any “complete 
picture” in perception; there are always elements of the individual that escape us, that 
cannot be revealed unless the individual in question chooses to reveal them. The 
perception of a stranger is much like a guessing game where the stranger provides “clues” 
as to the essence of his character (the “essence” in this case being those characteristics 
that constitute him), and we must put together a “picture” of him on our own. Although I 
agree with Simmel that the dyad possesses a paradoxical nature, I believe his distinction 
between “distance” and “strangeness” could have been more clearly formulated. He 
claims that distance “indicates” that one who is close by is remote, and that likewise 
strangeness indicates that one who is remote is close by. Written in this way, it is not 
really clear as to what actually constitutes both distance and strangeness; we are not told 
whether or not they are actual phenomena that we perceive, sensations or feelings of 
some kind, or if they are meant to convey a certain type of perceptual experience. What is 
especially confusing is that Simmel asserts that distance indicates the remoteness of one 
who is close. But if distance “indicates” remoteness, then this would seem to suggest that 
distance indicates distance, which is obviously a redundant claim. To add to this 
confusion, it is not made clear as to what exactly the nature of this “indication” is. 
Despite this confusion in Simmel’s writing, it is still possible to reformulate the notions
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-of distance and strangeness so that they may be used to describe the initial moment of 
intercultural perception.
The word “strange” is obviously quite broad and can convey a number of 
different meanings. If we are talking about perception (primarily visual in this case), then 
something that is strange is something that is unusual, something that we are not 
expecting to see because we do not normally encounter it within the milieu of our day-to- 
day activities. Something that we call strange might also evoke feelings of fear due to this 
unfamiliarity and the unexpectedness with which it strikes us. In this sense anything from 
a public trash can to a store window display may strike us as strange. That which is 
strange is also often something that we spend more time perceiving, as our minds race to 
“figure it out” or “explain it” seemingly automatically. In relation to cultural difference, 
then, strangeness can be understood as a particular kind o f reaction to the immediate 
perception of an individual whereby the perceiver experiences feelings of aversion,
repulsion, or even fear due to his unfamiliarity with the cultural practices that the 
; perceived individual’s appearance implicate.Distance, then, could be described as a 
cognitive phenomenon characterized by an absence, which is the inability of the 
perceiver to “place” or categorize the perceived individual in one’s mind due to the lack 
o f meaning5 that he conveys as a result of the perceiver’s unfamiliarity with and thus lack 
of understanding of the cultural practices that are implicated by his appearance. It follows 
then that distance is the condition for the experience of strangeness, since the perceiver
5 By “meaning” we are simply referring to whatever consciousness evokes by association based on what 
one already knows, or thinks one knows, about the appearance in question. So for example, i f  I see a man 
in an expensive-looking suit I might think “businessman,” “lawyer,” “money,” “high-paying job,” etc. 
There are no rules for what one will think based on an appearance, only that she associates it with 
something else in order to “place” the perceived individual in her mind, as Simmel says, into a type and/or 
social group. It should also be noted that perceptions o f  others are never certainties; they are guesses or. 
“musings” based on association from one’s own repertoire o f experience, and are thus always shrouded in 
ambiguity, which is perhaps what always provokes fascination in others.
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- does not have the information required to “make sense o f’ or “understand” the individual 
he perceives in his immediate field of vision.
Finally, we saw that Simmel’s third dimension of individuation consists of a set of 
forms that he calls “social a prioris.” According to him, the first of these categories is 
responsible for the construction of three aspects of an individual that we infer based on 
that individual’s appearance, including “type,” “ideal personality,” and “group 
affiliation” (for our purposes here we focused on both type and group affiliation). For 
Simmel, these “steps” are both cognitive processes whereby we identify individuals using 
preconceived social categories. But for Simmel this further implies that we neyer see an 
individual in her “completeness.” Instead we construct an “abstract totality” based on 
“fragments” of the individual, different percepts that we use to infer propositions about 
who that individual “is.” These propositions can only be constructed out of the social 
meanings6 that the percepts of the individuals carry for us. So here an obvious question 
arises for us: what happens when there is distance between the perceiver and the 
perceived, or between two perceivers? If the individual possesses no source of meaning 
in experience on which to draw propositions, is it still possible that he might do so? He 
might simply experience strangeness, as we discussed above. However, in order to 
protect himself from such confusion and uncomfortable feelings, he may also resort to 
what we will here call ignorance . I am not here using this word by its standard usage, 
although that sense of it is certainly implied. Ignorance as I define it is an active cognitive 
process, a kind of “cognitive compensation” whereby misinformation is substituted for
6 “Meaning” as defined above. . ^
7 Although Simmel does not explicitly discuss intercultural perception and thus does not come up with this 
concept on his own, I argue that there is no reason that it could be seen as being inconsistent with Simmers 
own logic; i f  we attempt to draw propositions about others based on what we think we know about their 
appearances, would such propositions not often be based on misinformation?
67
-accuracy in order to draw propositions about an individual. In other words, one will 
attempt to compensate for his lack of familiarity with the cultural practices of the 
perceived individual -  to compensate for distance - by using whatever information he has 
available to him, however inaccurate, whether it be his own social group’s prejudices, 
hearsay, “facts” from the media, etc. Ignorance as such is particularly widespread in 
large, socially heterogeneous urban spaces in which individuals possess little or no 
information about all of the other groups that they live amongst. Ignorance is thus 
essentially a way to deal with the fear that arises from a space of people who are 
essentially unidentifiable by feigning recognition; it can be done as easily as one 
identifies common everyday objects. Although ignorance may often be coupled with 
feelings of reserve or aversion, this is not necessarily the case. Ignorance is therefore a 
concept that fits well with what we have already explicated from Simmel, and provides
us with a fuller account of the moment of cross-cultural perception.
v
Merleau-Pontv and Cross-Cultural Perception
In chapter two, we provided an account of Merleau-Ponty’s most fundamental 
claims regarding intersubjective relations. This account consisted of several different 
claims, including the notion of the “primordial presence” of the social, the claim that it is 
primarily social relations that allow the child to learn about his world, the notion of 
intercorporeity, the notion of intersubjectivity as a system, and finally intersubjectivity as 
it is constituted through Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh. In the following section of 
this chapter, as we did above with Simmel, we will determine whether or not any of
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Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the nature of intersubjectivity are useful in providing us 
with a descriptive account of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception.
a. Critique
As we saw in chapter two, we called one of Merleau-Ponty’s major notions
regarding intersubjectivity the “primordial presence” of the social, which is the idea that
the social world is always already present as a dimension of the world that we find
ourselves in, which of course implies that, like the natural world, we are inseperable from
it and it is therefore partly what constitutes us. This is of course the same as saying that.
life itself possesses an intersubjective character, that it is impossible to conceive of a
world in which we could live without others and at the same time possess all of the
intelligent capacities that we have now. Merleau-Ponty makes the additional claim that
the existence of others cannot be proven, that there exists a kind of immediate, intuitive 
- - , , v .
knowledge of the other, a kind of “pure presence” by which we know that she exists (one
might here notice the similarity to Simmel’s argument that the other is “irreducible,” that
she simply appears to usi as such in perception). These points may have more profound
implications than one may initially realize, and are thus propositions that should certainly
r
be pursued further in social philosophy. However, these insights unfortunately tell us 
nothing about how we perceive difference in the social world. It is for this reason alone 
that we cannot use Merleau-Ponty’s notion of primordial presence in order to help us 
understand the initial moment of cross-cultural perception.
The second point regarding the nature of intersubjectivity that Merleau-Ponty
illustrates is largely an elaboration of one of the implications of his first point which is/'
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that human beings from birth onward cannot develop intelligent capacities without others 
to teach them how to live in the world. He therefore goes a step further than he does in 
PP and suggests that one comes to know the social world prior to the natural world, that 
in fact one’s knowledge of the latter is dependent upon the teachings of others. It is 
therefore these primary social relations that allow the intelligent capacities of children to 
develop. Therefore, by the time of this lecture it is clear thaf Merleau-Ponty has 
elaborated his argument from PP by saying that not only do the natural and the social 
world “coexist” as dimensions of the same reality, but so too is our understanding of the 
former enabled by the latter. Our world thus first and foremost possesses an 
intersubjective character, which is to say that it is constituted through the medium of our 
relations with others. Again, this is a fascinating argument, and I would argue that it 
deserves further attention using more recent studies in developmental psychology in 
order for it to be examined further. However, it cannot clearly be applied to the problem 
that we here wish to address for the same reason that we could not apply the notion of 
primordial presence: it does not tell us anything about the perception of cultural 
difference. One could perhaps take Merleau-Ponty’s thesis in a more specific direction by 
conducting a study of the ways in which children in different social groups are raised to 
perceive cultural differences. But the argument itself only points to such a study, and 
could not in itself be used to provide us with a positive description of existing 
cosmopolitanism. /
In order to further elaborate his notion of intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty 
introduces a notion in PHS that he refers to as both “intercorporeality” and “carnal 
intersubjectivity.” As we saw in chapter two, the notion is meant to express the idea of a
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universal sensibility of which all things living and non-living are a part, an “absolute of 
presence” that ties everything together and is thus even more fundamental to the 
constitution of a human in the world than intersubjectivity itself. Indeed, it is that on 
which all experience depends. As we also discussed in the last chapter, this notion 
arguably prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh later presented in VI, The flesh, 
we saw, is a fundamental “element” of being, a general visibility that pervades sensing 
beings, and through which the sensible and the sensing “overlap” as parts of a “single 
corporeal fabric.” As noted, the concept is Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to rid philosophy of 
the subject-object distinction. Merleau-Ponty of course also provides points about 
intersubjectivity that are formulated based on this notion. Just as he says in PP, it is the 
world that connects us, that acts as the shared medium whereby we communicate. This is 
nonetheless a paradoxical phenomenon, since the things seen in the world are only what /  
see, and at the same time what we all see. Therefore, in VI as in PHS, Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to rid philosophy of the subject-object distinction byThetaphysically uniting all 
beings within a universal phenomenon of which they are all a part, this time “the flesh” 
as opposed to intercorporeality. In doing so, the other is always a potential source of 
knowledge for me since he offers multiple perspectives on the same world. We are thus
all both a dimension and a universal within an anonymous visibility by which the sentient
(.
and the sensed overlap and remain perceptually inexhaustible.
So again, the question is how it is that Merleau-Ponty’s novel approach to 
intersubjectivity can be applied to our purpose in this work. In the case of both 
intercorporeality and the flesh, Merleau-Ponty reduces being (and therefore all of us) to 
the same general phenomenon, whether it be “sensibility” or “visibility.” In doing so, he
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-philosophically establishes human life as being constituted by a single fundamental 
“element of being,” which nonetheless is also able to account for the inexhaustible 
difference inherent in perception simply by encompassing all of it in its universality. 
Such a formulation could potentially be helpful in establishing some sort of normative 
cosmopolitan ethic, as it could provide a philosophical foundation with which to conceive 
of humanity as fundamentally constituted by the same general element of existence. It 
might from there be possible to argue one’s way towards a similar foundation for a 
universal morality. Despite the conceptual, ethical and political problems that might arise 
from such an endeavour, what we need to emphasize here is that neither the concept of 
intercorporeality nor visibility can aid us in our purpose since they are ultimately 
ineffective in explaining how difference is actually perceived in the world by different 
individuals. In attempting to construct the notion of a single element of being under 
which all life falls, Merleau-Ponty ends up foregoing any account of thq differences 
inherent in perception aside from the very fact that they exist;-Therefore, since through 
these notions Merleau-Ponty attempts to conceive of perception through sameness rather 
than difference, we cannot here use either of them to help us understand the perception of 
social difference in intercultural perception.
b. Appropriation
In chapter two, we saw that Merleau-Ponty refers to intersubjectivity throughout 
his work as a “system” or “structure.” As a body in the world, a human being comes to be 
aware of his world through his body schema, which is the perception of the body’s 
position in relation to the coordinates of its environment. Since I am conscious of myself
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-first and foremost as this body in the world, then, it follows that my consciousness is not 
simply a private experience, but is also turned out toward the world. Since I can interpret 
my own actions, it follows that those who possess the same bodily structure as myself can 
interpret them as well and find meaning in them. For Merleau-Ponty, bodies are thus 
essentially forms of behaviour that constitute and directly convey meanings for others. 
He infers from this that two bodies in communication constitute a structure, since the 
visual image of another is interpreted by the notion I have of my own body. Thus for 
Merleau-Ponty we find “a familiar way of dealing with the world” in another’s body. 
Through the perception of one another, bodies are coupled through meaningful actions 
that pair them through the exchange of intentions. Merleau-Ponty’s system of 
intersubjectivity is therefore similar to Simmel’s notion of the dyad, since both notions 
are descriptive of the most elementary structure by which humans interact. Furthermore, 
Merleau-Ponty adds an important feature to our descriptive account of the initial moment 
of cross-cultural perception, namely the body as a purveyor of meaning in perception. 
Although one could argue that Simmel implies the body in his work, he never speaks of it 
as a concrete entity in the world that conveys meaning in and of itself. On the other hand, 
in Merleau-Ponty’s case, we can see that through his account of the system of 
intersubjectivity he conceives of the body as that which constitutes and conveys meaning, 
thus making social life possible. Therefore, in much the same way that we interpreted 
Simmel’s notion of fashion as an embodied cultural practice, so too can we think of the 
body as culturally constituted, since meaning is given through cultural practice. 
Therefore, not only will an individual express culturally transmitted meanings through 
fashion, but so too will he express such meanings using his own body, the perceptible
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locus of all cultural practice. We will therefore use Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as 
a form of behaviour in our account of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception.
The Initial Moment o f Cross-Cultural Perception
What we have gained from our critique and appropriation (and in Simmel’s case, 
modification) of Simmel and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are a list of seven concepts that 
enable a description of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception as experienced by 
an individual in the course of her everyday life. These concepts include “the irreducibility 
of the other,” “the body,” “fashion,” “strangeness,” “distance,” “meaning,” and 
“ignorance.” The purpose of the following section is not just simply summarize what has 
already been said, but also to elaborate these concepts a bit more in order to more clearly 
articulate them. I will do this simply through a description of the initial moment of cross-
cultural perception as it would take place according to these concepts8.1 argue that such a
■ y ■ . ; . X
description might potentially be used to highlight certain ways of perceiving that prevent 
people from even attempting to live cosmopolitan lifestyles. With the aid of directed 
empirical research, further studies might enable us to uncover the social conditions that 
lead to the repeated formulation of such perceptions so that we might develop social 
reform strategies that might make the practice of cosmopolitanism a more realistic goal 
for our society.
As we illustrated, both Simmel and Merleau-Ponty argue that the other is 
perceived before us instantaneously. When I see someone, I do not have to “make sure” it
8 Such a description would also need to provide a theoretical account o f  the kinds o f  space in which such 
perceptions might take place, however we unfortunately cannot elaborate on this complex dimension o f  
perception here.
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is a person through some sort of analogical reasoning process. Instead, I  just see him as 
another like myself immediately and, in most cases, certainly; as Simmel says, he is an 
“irreducible entity,” and I instantly recognize him for what he is, another human being 
like myself. But this is of course not all that happens when I see him; I do not simply 
recognize him as being human without inferring anything else. Instead, I perceive certain 
details of his appearance, and along with this perception a very specific kind of cognitive 
process takes place that above we called meaning. We derived this notion from Simmel’s 
first social a priori, a form of cognition that seeks to identify a perceived individual by 
associating him with the memory of others perceived in the past, thus categorizing him 
under a certain social type and placing him within a certain social group. This kind of 
meaning is derived automatically by the perceiver in an effort to navigate his 
environment in much the same way that one would identify perceived objects; one wants 
not only to be able to grasp his surroundings and be able to orient himself toward them, 
but also know whether or not he could make use of a perceivect object in his immediate 
environment, an inquiry related to other basic questions by which we operationalize our 
surroundings: is this object to be further acknowledged or ignored? Does it pose a 
potential threat to me? What other possibilities might it have for me within the context of 
my current situation? These and other basic questions are all automatically considered 
during the course of our daily lives when we identify objects, and the same is no less true 
of people: What exactly is my relation to this person, if any, within the context of my 
current situation? Does this person pose a potential threat to my well-being? Should I 
avoid this person or orient myself toward him? For what reasons? Therefore, although 
there can exist a certain voyeuristic quality in observing others, the automatic derivation
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of meaning from such an act of observation serves a much more rudimentary function, 
which is to enable myself according to my goals within the context of my immediate 
environment, with the expectation of the consequences that certain actions will bring in 
the future. As Merleau-Ponty says, I am a body in a world that transcends me, and as 
such I want to grasp my environment to the greatest possible extent so as to grant a
c
certain illusion of predictability in order to make certain decisions that will hopefully 
enable me to bring about the desired consequences for me. Humans are invariably 
creatures of strategy, and this is ultimately why we automatically project certain social 
meanings onto others.
The cognition of the kind of meaning we are discussing, as we demonstrated, is 
made possible through the seemingly simultaneous perception of the two most basic 
elements of another’s appearance, namely the body o f the other as well as her fashion, a 
word that we are simply using to designate the clothing that she wears as a form of 
signification. In much the same way that Merleau-Ponty describes two interacting 
individuals as being two sides of the same system, so too could we regard the body and 
fashion as being “two halves of a whole,” the two main “meaning-giving” aspects of a 
single, irreducable individual that allows us to identify her as assuredly as possible at any 
given moment. The body allows for the interpretation of the individual primarily through 
a number of different features of perception that are isolated and made analytically 
distinguishable (meaning they can be separated and thus considered individually in 
perception, thought and discussion) through the use of words such as “size,” “shape,” 
“weight,” “gait,” “gesture,” “voice,” and “language,” while fashion lends meaning 
through the cultural traits and practices that it signifies (namely the social “type” of
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person that the individual is, i.e. what characteristics constitute her, and what group she 
“belongs to,” i.e. what characteristics constitute them). Both the body and fashion 
accompany one another in full complementarity in perception, supplementing the 
meanings of one another as if they were inextricably bound together. What this means is 
simply that when observing the individual we never interpret one’s body in absence of its 
fashion, nor vice versa; whatever aspects of the individual’s body that we choose to focus 
on, these aspects will only provide meaning in relation to the meaning of one’s fashion, 
and similarly whatever aspects of the individual’s fashion that we choose to focus on. In 
other words, I do not interpret the “meaning” of the shoe without that of the leg, I do not 
interpret the face without reference to the sunglasses that cover part of it. In perception, 
the features of an individual’s appearance seamlessly blend together into single, 
multifaceted percepts, but these percepts are only made possible through the attachment 
of composite elements. Again, it is these “elements” that constitute the visible features of 
the individual’s body and its fashion that make meaning possible, that allow us to be 
social by allowing us to be placed into categories. .
Now, we know that cultural practices find expression through bodily practices. 
This means that, if an individual comes from a cultural background constituted by 
practices that are unfamiliar to the perceiver, and these practices are signified in the 
individual’s body as well as his fashion, it follows that the perceiver will be unable to 
find meaning in the individual’s appearance and will thus be unable to identify him 
through a cognitive process of social categorization. This is where our remaining three 
concepts come into play, namely strangeness, distance, and ignorance. The first two are 
invariably intertwined and are experienced as facets of the same moment, however as we
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argued above, it is the latter that is the condition of the former. For when an individual’s 
appearance transcends my repertoire of remembered social experience and I am thus 
unable to even tentatively identify him, then cognitively I experience the opposite of 
meaning which is what we called distance. Because I am unable to identify the individual 
he becomes a source of confusion, an aspect of my environment that is to a large degree 
“unknown,” and I am therefore unable to determine my potential relation to it following 
the initial moment of perception. This uncertainty, we argued, is often felt in a kind of 
sensation that we called strangeness, a feeling of apprehension and even aversion that 
arises from the fact that T cannot even tentatively identify this individual who constitutes 
an element of my surroundings. However, as we also noted, any individual, however 
inadvertently, might try to compensate for distance through what we called ignorance. In 
essence the latter is a cognitive process whereby misinformation (that is, information that 
does not accurately represent the “reality”, of certain cultural practices, i.e. prejudice) is 
presented as information. Due to a lack of accurate knowledge about the cultural 
practices that another’s appearance signifies, the individual instead supplements 
information received from sources that have previously provided false information in 
order to identify the perceived individual. Although such a process may prevent the 
perceiver from experiencing distance and strangeness and thus supply him with a sense of 
confidence or empowerment within surroundings that might otherwise cause sensations 
of fear and confusion, it does not necessarily encourage cosmopolitan behaviours, 
especially in more extreme cases where the perceiver believes that he has been given 
reasons to fear or even hate individuals from a particular cultural background because of 
the way that he has processed and re-articulated the misinformation that he has received.
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I have used the thought of Simmel arid Merleau-Ponty in order to construct a 
descriptive account of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception that provides a 
challenge to liberal cosmopolitan thinkers like Appiah who believe that cross-cultural 
encounters should begin with courage, openness, and an insatiable curiousity and 
willingness to learn. Although this is an admirable ideal to aspire to in practice, and one 
that I do not contest, it is ultimately a statement of the obvious, one that, on its own, 
suggests that we can just do these things without hesitation. It provides no account of 
perception as that which, as a social phenomenon that is therefore subject to seemingly 
infinite variability, might hinder potential cosmopolitan initiatives. Furthermore, it 
grounds its optimism in an incomplete picture of humanity that presents us all, as 
possessing the “universal” traits of reason and morality that somehow saturate us with an 
indescript “dignity.” But it is of the utmost importance, when considering ethical issues, 
not to forget that the human being consists of far more than a handful of praiseworthy 
virtues“ The homo sapien brain is tens of thousands of years-old, and its predecessors 
even older; long before there was art, architecture, literature, music, poetry, science and
v
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“civilization,” before the idea of reason was even thought of, before philosophy was even 
a word, our brains evolved to do exactly what that of every other living species evolved 
to do, to work for the single irrefutable purpose of life that we share with every other 
animal, namely, survival. This is the single primordial purpose of every human that has 
ever existed, and as organisms built for survival there is a single process of which we are 
all familiar, namely coming to know our immediate environments in order to assess 
potential threats to our survival. Like; every other animal we seek to “know” our 
environment, and anything “unknown” automatically fills us with apprehension because
(
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we are unable to guess what its effects on us might be. It is this same biological function 
of perception that makes us afraid of strangers, especially those whose life practices we 
do not have knowledge of and thus cannot identify. Therefore, the most logical course of 
action in light of this problem would be to alleviate such fears through processes that 
would acquaint people with cultures other than their own so that the people from these 
backgrounds would no longer be unknown to them, and therefore no longer exist in their 
environments as something to be feared. The task of cosmopolitan theory, then, should 
not simply be to argue that cosmopolitanism is a great lifestyle and that people should, 
therefore, just go out and do it. The task is rather to consult both theoretical and empirical 
research on cross-cultural perception in order not only to understand the socio-economic 
conditions under which certain perceptions of particular social groups develop, but to 
suggest strategies that would enable people to alter those conditions in order to enable a 
cosmopolitan ethics and lifestyle. Simply put, cosmopolitan theory has to become more 
critically engaged with the socio-economic issues that prevent the practice of
cosmopolitanism from flourishing today. We already know what to do to be
\
cosmopolitan. The question that remains is how it is that we should transform our society 
so that cosmopolitanism will become a more desirable lifestyle to aspire to for 
individuals from all walks of life. Cosmopolitan theorists are in a very privileged position 
that will allow them to consider this question carefully. I have here provided the starting 
point of such an endeavour, a handful of concepts that can be used to understand the 
social-psychological dynamics of cross-cultural interaction. They were constructed from 
a single point of view, however, and need to be expanded upon using both theoretical and
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empirical research. Only then can we figure out how it is that we might be able to make 
the practice of cosmopolitanism a more realizable ideal.
Conclusion:
The purpose of this work was to illustrate the shortcomings of Appiah’s theory of 
liberal cosmopolitanism by comparing it with my own descriptive account of the initial 
moment of cross-cultural perception that was constructed through a critique of both 
Simmel and Merleau-Ponty’s respective theories ofhow.it is that we perceive others. I 
argued that although Appiah tells us what our individual attitudes should be as practicing 
cosmopolitans, he does not address the issue of how it is that we might convince large 
numbers of people to embrace such an attitude for themselves as well as for others. I 
further argued that in order to address this issue, cosmopolitan theory must take into 
account studies of social perception in order to develop strategies for removing the socio­
economic barriers that prevent our societies from becoming cosmopolitan. I will here
. . . . .  . . X, ...
provide a summary of this work as it was presented, followed by some final remarks.
In Chapter One, we provided an explication of Simmel’s neo-Kantian model of 
social cognition that we named the “moment of individuation.” According to Simmel, 
such a moment of the perception of the other is made possible by the joint operation of 
three forms (a priori functions of cognition) that make social life possible by forming 
distinct (but also similar) percepts of other beings like ourselves that we can 
communicate with in the world. Simmel accounts for three dimensions of this moment in 
his work using a number of different concepts. The first dimension accounts for the 
perception of the individual as such, a dimension made possible by the category of the 
Thou, which provides the “form,” “shape,” or “contour” of the body (the vertical aspect)
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that is both the same and different from myself, an irreducible entity that through its very 
existence places me in a distinct type of relationship to it that Simmel calls 
“understanding.” This necessarily paradoxical relationship (the horizontal aspect) is an 
affective connection that can be understood as a potential sociation, the pre-dyadic 
possibility of dyadic reciprocation through social type identification. The second 
dimension of individuation allows us to “read” social meanings that others carry using 
their own signifying agency. These categories work to construct the loci (“centres”) of 
signification that constitute the “surface” of the body, aggregates of signification that in 
themselves are characterized by nothing but their very signifyingness. In other words, the 
semantic content of these surfaces as collections of signifiers depends entirely on the 
associations conjured by the individual observing them, associations which possess 
infinite variation based on a host personal, historical, and cultural factors. Finally, there is 
the third, “social-propositional” a priori, which formulates and then attributes 
characterological propositions to individuals based on type'and group membership, 
conclusions that are reached based on what was inferred from (by organizing the 
information gleaned from) the bodily surfaces of signification.
In Chapter Two, we provided another detailed explication, this time of Merleau- 
Ponty’s phenomenological account of intersubjectivity that, like Simmel’s moment of ' 
individuation, seeks to describe the constitutive elements that are present when we come 
to perceive another. Having first provided a close reading of Chapter Four in Part Two of 
PP, we saw that Merleau-Ponty begins his theory of intersubjectivity by responding to 
the “problem of the other” in Western thought. He concludes that the social world is a 
primordial dimension of existence that is always already present to us when we come to
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observe it or consider it in reflection. Although I cannot experience another’s 
consciousness in the same way that I experience my own, the other still offers itself for 
interpretation to me as a body in the world that has the same structure as mine and is thus 
also a form of behaviour. It therefore inevitably “reveals” its consciousness to me as a 
being that expresses meaning in behaviour. For Merleau-Ponty, two individuals in 
communication with one another therefore constitute a system whereby meaning is 
exchanged, an idea he describes in even more detail in CRO. Although he argues in PP 
that the natural world and the social world are two dimensions of the same world, in CRO 
he credits the latter as taking precedence over the former in the development of human 
intelligence. But then the question arises as to how association is possible, or how it is 
that the social world constitutes the most basic level of our existence. He tries to explain 
this first through the notion of intercorporeality presented in PHS, and then later through 
an account of intersubjectivity that relies on his notion of the flesh in VI. In the former he 
states that the other can only be present for me “beneath the order of thought” through a 
kind of pure sensibility, what he calls an “absolute of presence” that is the condition of 
possibility for organisms to become known to one another in perception. This idea later 
becomes the notion of the flesh that he attempts to articulate in VI. Merleau-Ponty claims 
that the flesh is the most fundamental “element of being,” an all-pervasive “visibility” 
that is, once again, the condition of possibility for “the return of the visible upon itself.” 
By placing all of humanity under a single universal phenomenon as opposed to breaking 
it up in analysis into single solipsistic units, Merleau-Ponty can argue that there exist no 
clear limits between perceiving entities in the sensible world. This allows him to 
formulate an argument similar to the one in PP, which is that individuals are simply
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different perspectives on the same world. Intersubjectivity is an inevitable reality, then, 
since I can offer my perspective to another just as he can offer his to me.
In Chapter Three we began with an explication of Appiah’s theory of liberal 
cosmopolitanism. We saw that there are two claims that are central to his philosophy, one 
being the liberal tenet that each individual has the right to her own individual autonomy, 
and the second being that each human being has a moral obligation to every other. In 
spite of these claims, Appiah says, there exists the reality of cultural difference. For him 
this is a reality to be embraced since encounters with this difference provide opportunities 
for personal growth. He insists that such encounters are possible because we all possess 
universal human traits. He further insists that we do not need to agree with or even 
understand different cultural values, as long as none of them conflict with one’s own 
individual autonomy. The main criticism we had of Appiah’s cosmopolitanism began 
with the claim that each individual has a moral obligation to every other. The problem 
with this claim is that there exists nothing in reality that assured us of its truth, and so it
becomes Appiah’s responsibility as one who is putting forth the claim to convince the
\
reader of its truth, a task that he does not. attempt even though the idea is central to 
cosmopolitanism. He also neglects to defend his claim that dialogue with people from 
other walks of life will enrich one’s own life. Again, he simply says that it does, without 
addressing any claims to the contrary.
In response to Appiah, we provided a critique of both Simmel and Merleau- 
Ponty’s respective accounts of the perception of others in order to provide our own 
descriptive account of the initial moment of cross-cultural perception. We started with a 
critique of Simmel, and found that his category of the Thou and his notion of fashion
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v/ere concepts that were useful to the construction of our account. We then found that we 
could modify some of SimmePs concepts in order to create several new concepts. We 
then moved on to a critique of Merleau-Ponty and found that his notion of the body was 
the only concept that would be useful for our own. It ended up consisting, then, of seven 
different notions that we described in detail, including “the irreducibility of the other,” 
“the body,” “fashion,” “strangeness,” “distance,” “meaning,” and “ignorance.” The 
purpose of providing such an account was to illustrate the fact that our perceptions of 
others often prevent us from engaging -  or even wanting to engage -  with them. By 
depicting this prevalent reality, we wanted to show that there exist social problems that 
cosmopolitan thinkers need to address if they hope to convincingly argue that 
cosmopolitanism can and should become a widespread practice.
People make their decisions based on their perception of reality; they choose to 
act in certain ways because they have perceived something a certain way. If cosmopolitan 
theory is to have any relevance to the societies without which if'could not exist, it should
seek to uncover the reasons that people develop perceptions of others that might lead
\
them to actions -  whether aversive or violent - that will perpetuate social discord within 
pluralistic societies. Cosmopolitan theory cannot serve any purpose to the larger society 
that allows it to be produced if it remains entirely philosophical; its claims must be 
supported by both theoretical and empirical social research that can help individuals to 
understand why it is that people engage in anticosmopolitan behaviours, why they either 
act out against the induction of those who are different into their society, or why they are 
indifferent to groups other than their own. For if we cannot isolate the social conditions 
that lead to the development of certain perceptions which in turn lead to harmful actions,
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then we cannot understand anticosmopolitanism as a social problem, and in turn cannot 
do anything to seek out a remedy. Appiah proposes that we “get used” to one another, but 
we cannot get people to do this if they already possess certain perceptions of others that 
make them think that those others are not worth getting used to. Although what I have 
provided here is only a starting point to the endeavour discussed above, it is one that I 
believe to be crucial to a society that is becoming increasingly multicultural. What I 
would recommend for future studies is not only vigourous empirical research to 
supplement the theoretical, but also a continued focus on the initial moment of cross- 
cultural perception from varying social, economic and cultural standpoints. From these 
findings it might be possible to move on to the subsequent, more complex moments of 
cross-cultural interaction, studies that would provide insights into how we might get used 




Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 1998. “Cosmopolitan Patriots.” Pp. 91-114 in 
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, edited by Pheng 
Cheah and Bruce Robbins. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2005. The Ethics of Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. Cosmopolitanism : Ethics in a World of 
Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Barbaras, Renaud. 2004. The Being of the Phenomenon : Merleau-Ponty's
Ontology, translated by Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press.
Barral, Mary Rose. 1984. The Body in Interpersonal Relations: Merleau-Ponty. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Beck, Ulrich. 1998. “The Cosmopolitan Manifesto.” New Statesman 20: 28-30.
Calhoun, Craig. 2002. “Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere:
Interests, Identity, and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe.” Pp. 275-312 
in Global Ethics and Transnational Politics, edited by Pablo DeGreiff and 
Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, AAA: MIT Press.
Carman, Taylor. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. New York: Routleige.
Cheah, Pheng, and Bruce Robbins, eds. 1998. Cosmopolitics : Thinking and 
Feeling Beyond the Nation. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press.
Dastur, Françoise. 2008. “Merleau-Ponty and the Question of the Other.” 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39(1 ): 27-42.
Delanty, Gerard. 2000. Citizenship in a Global Age. Buckingham: Open 
University Press.
Delanty, Gerard. 2001. “Cosmopolitanism and Violence: The Limits of a Global 
Civil Society.” European Journal of Social Theory 4(1): 41-52.
Friedman, Jonathan. 1994. Cultural Identity and Global Process. London: Sage.
Hannerz, Ulf. 1990. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture.” Pp. 237-251 
in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, edited by 
Mike Featherstone. London: Sage.
88
Hass, Lawrence. 2008. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Hooft, Stan van. 2009. Cosmopolitanism : A Philosophy for Global Ethics. 
Montreal 8t Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Iyer, Pico. 1997. “The Nowhere Man,” Prospect, February, pp. 30-33.
Kaern, Michael. 1990. “The World as Human Construction.” Pp. 75-98 in Boston 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 119, Georg Simmel and 
Contemporary Sociology, edited by Michael Kaern, Bernard S. Phillips and 
Robert S. Cohen. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Lanigan, Richard L. 1972. Speaking and Semiology : Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenological Theory of Existential Communication. The Hague: 
Mouton.
Levine, Donald N., ed. 1971. Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964a. “The Child’s Relations with Others.” Pp. 96- 
155 in The Primacy of Perception And Other Essays on Phenomenological 
Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, edited by James M. 
Edie, translated by William Cobb. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964b. “The Philosopher and His Shadow.” Pp. 159- 
181 in Signs, translated by Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press. x
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and the Invisible, edited by Claude 
Lefort, translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2002. Phenomenology of Perception. New York: 
Routledge.
Nedelmann, Birgitta. 1990. “Georg Simmel as an Analyst of Autonomous
Dynamics: The Merry-Go-Round of Fashion.” Pp. 243-257 in Boston Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 119, Georg Simmel and Contemporary 
Sociology, edited by Michael Kaern, Bernard S. Phillips, and Robert S. 
Cohen. Boston: Kluwer Academic.




Oakes, Guy. 1980. Georg Simmel: Essays on Interpretation in Social Science. 
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield;
Pogge, Thomas. 1992. “Cosmopolitans and Sovereignty.” Ethics 103: 48-75.
Pollock, Sheldon, Homi K. Bhabha, Carol A. Breckenridge, and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty. 2000. "Cosmopolitanisms." Public Culture 12(3): 577-589.
Priest, Stephen. 1998. Merleau-Ponty. New York: Routledge.
Simmel, Georg. 1950. “The Isolated Individual and the Dyad.” Pp. 118-144 in 
The Sociology of Georg Simmel, edited by Kurt Wolff. London: Free Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1971a. “The Transcendent Character of Life.” Pp. 353-374 in 
Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms, edited by Donald N. 
Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Simniel, Georg. 1971b. “The Problem of Sociology.” Pp. 23-35 in Georg Simmel: 
On Individuality and Social Forms, edited by Donald N. Levine. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1971c. “The Stranger.” Pp. 143-149 in Georg Simmel: On 
Individuality and Social Forms, edited by Donald N. Levine. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1971d. “How Is Society Possible?” PpT6-22 in Georg Simmel: On 
Individuality and Social Forms, edited by Donald N. Levine. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1980a. “On the Nature of Historical Understanding.” Pp. 97-126 
in Georg Simmel: Essays on Interpretation in Social Science, edited by Guy 
Oakes. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Simmel, Georg. 1980b. “The Constitutive Concepts of History.” Pp. 145-197 in 
Georg Simmel: Essays on Interpretation in Social Science, ed. Guy Oakes. 
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Simmel, Georg. 1997a. “Sociology of the Senses.” Pp. 109-120 in Simmel on 
Culture, edited by David Frisby and Mike Featherstone. London: Sage.
Simmel, Georg. 1997b. “The Philosophy of Fashion.” Pp. 187-206 in Simmel on 
Culture, edited by David Frisby and Mike Featherstone. London: Sage.
Simmel, Georg. 2007. “The Social Boundary.” Theory, Culture and Society 24: 
53-56.
90
Spurting, Laurie. 1977. Phenomenology and the Social World : The Philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty and its Relation to the Social Sciences. Boston: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul.
Toadvine, Ted, and Lester Embree, eds. 2002. Merleau-Ponty's Reading of 
Husserl. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Varouxakis, Georgios. 1999. “How ‘Cosmopolitan’ Can Patriotism Be?” ASEN 
Bulletin 16: 3-7.
Vertovec, Steven. 1996. “Berlin Multikulti: Germany, ‘Foreigners,’ and ‘World­
openness.’” New Community 22(3): 381-399.
Vertovec, Steven, and Robin Cohen. 2002. Conceiving Cosmopolitanism : 
Theory, Context and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1992. “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative.” 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25(3): 751 -793.
Ware, Owen. 2006. “Ontology, Otherness, and Self-Alterity: Intersubjectivity in 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental 
Philosophy 10 (2): 503-513.
Weingartner, Rudolph. 1959. "Form and Content in Simmel's Philosophy of Life." 
Pp. 33-60 in Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics by Georg 
Simmel et al., edited by Kurt Wolff. New York: Ohio State University Press.
Weingartner, Rudolph. 1960. Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg 
Simmel. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Weinstein, Deena and Michael A. Weinstein, eds. 1993. “On the Visual
Constitution of Society: The Contributions of Georg Simmel and Jean-Paul 
Sartre to a Sociology of the Senses.” Pp. 28-45 in Postmodern(ized) Simmel. 
New York: Routledge.
91
